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NATIONAL DEFENSEAND THE ENVIRONMENT
INTRODUCTION

Stephen Dycus has written an enormously useful and informative book about the conflicts between the demands- real and
imagined- of national security and the law and policy of environmental protection. Many of the conflicts are obvious: Iraq's
deliberate oil spills and well fires during the Persian Gulf War;
the appalling environmental contamination left by the manufacture of nuclear weapons; the production and use of chemical
defoliants like Agent Orange; and the myriad unexploded landmines left behind by even small wars. Other conflicts are less
obvious but nevertheless substantial: air and water pollution
caused by fleets of military vehicles and large-scale defense industries; the ecological effects of billeting, training, and deploying large numbers of troops and equipment; and the disposal of
unused chemical, conventional, and nuclear weapons. All of
these conflicts result from war and preparations for war and
from conventional as well as chemical and nuclear weapons.
While a few of the activities are deliberately destructive, the majority are incidental to otherwise legitimate military activities.
Professor Dycus firmly believes that "we can have it both
ways" (p. 185),' and National Defense and the Environment is intended to demonstrate that we can, with planning and forethought, maintain military preparedness and conduct military
operations with a minimum of environmental harm. He utilizes
a comprehensive survey of issues and examples to make this
point, identifying many specific conflicts between defense activities and environmental protection, explaining the relevant legal
principles and urging that defense activities be brought into
compliance with existing environmental laws. Dycus- who has
written previously on this subject,2 taught it at West Point, and
studied it with the Natural Resources Defense Council- is neither naive nor polemical in his views, and his book displays a
balanced understanding of both the military and environmental
positions and cultures.
As a close observer of the Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts to address the environmental problems of the Nuclear
Weapons Complex,' I read National Defense and the Environment
1. Parenthetical references are to STEPHEN DYCUs, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1996).
2. See, e.g., STEPHEN DYcus ET AL., NATIONAL SECURrTY LAW (2d ed. 1997); Stephen Dycus, NEPA Secrets, 2 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 300 (1993).
3. From 1993 to 1998, I chaired the citizens advisory board (the Femald Citizens Task Force) at DOE's former uranium refinery at Fernald, Ohio, and I served as
a peer reviewer for the risk assessment of the Nevada Test Site (where approximately
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with particular interest. DOE's experience complements and
underscores Dycus' conclusions. The atomic bomb's legacy of
disregarded environmental laws and massive environmental
contamination is in many ways the extreme example of the conflict between national security and environmental protection.4
This review thus focuses on DOE's experience to develop more
fully Dycus' approach to national defense and the environment.
It is not widely understood that the Manhattan Project's
achievement was at least as much the engineering marvel of producing fissionable material in quantity at the facilities of Hanford
and Oak Ridge as it was the ingenious theoretical work of Oppenheimer and his colleagues at Los Alamos. 5 The scale of the
facilities matched their significance. The Hanfords and Oak
Ridges, and their Cold War successors at places like Savannah
River, Rocky Flats, and Fernald, comprised a vast "industrial
empire"6 that specialized in inherently hazardous- even exotic- materials. For the most part, these facilities operated in
secrecy. Like the Department of Defense (DOD), there are some
in DOE who "still seem determined to carry out their military
missions without regard for the environmental costs," and DOE
is still in many ways "like a very large industrial company that is
lagging five to ten years behind its corporate counterparts in
compliance with the environmental laws" (p. 6). Both agencies
face extremely diverse environmental issues, some of which seem
intractable.
Nevertheless, there is reason for hope. Good-faith, sensible,
and public application of environmental laws can be consistent
with military preparedness. In Dycus' words, "with rare excep1,000 nuclear weapons were detonated). I am also a member of the Environmental
Management Advisory Board, which advises the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management on issues that affect the DOE clean-up program as a whole.
4. For general descriptions of the problem, see U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, CLOSING
THE CIRCLE ON THE SPLITTING OF THE ATOM: THE ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND WHAT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY IS

DOING ABOUT IT (1995); U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, LINKING LEGACIES: CONNECTING THE COLD
ENVIRONMENTAL
TO THEIR
PROCESSES
PRODUCTION
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
WAR
CONSEQUENCES (1997) [hereinafter LINKING LEGACIES]; U.S. DEP't OF ENERGY, THE 1996
BASELINE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT REPORT, VOLUME I (1996) [hereinafter 1996

BEMR. Volume I];

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,

U.S.

CONGRESS,

COMPLEX

CLEANUP: THE ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION (1991) [here-

inafter COMPLEX CLEANUP].
5. Which is not to say that the weapons laboratories, including Los Alamos, do
not have environmental problems. They are many and serious, but their scale is
dwarfed by the liquid waste tanks at Hanford, the reprocessing canyons at Savannah
River, and the vagrant plutonium at Rocky Flats, to name a few of the production facilities' problems. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4.
6. COMPLEX CLEANUP, supranote 4, at 3.
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tions, we can maintain a strong, effective defense without endangering the public health or destroying our natural resources" (p.
185). DOD now invests billions of dollars in environmental
quality measures such as compliance, cleanup, pollution prevention, and conservation. A Deputy Undersecretary of Defense
for Environmental Security oversees environmental protection
activities throughout the Department. Like DOD, DOE recognizes the need to reconcile its military mission with environmental responsibilities and is in the process of remedying its
past mistakes, a change resulting at least in part from a changing of the guard in the agency. DOE is now investing heavily in
environmental protection. The Office of Environmental Management (EM) accounts for about one third of DOE's budget. DOE's
senior management is demonstrating a genuine commitment to
Moreover, the defense establishment posthe environment.
sesses a unique ability to lead the way in developing and implementing environmentally responsible policies and practices. In
this sense, the history of environmental neglect and destruction
is also a menu of opportunities- hence the half-full glass of this
Review's title.
This Review begins with a description of National Defense
and the Environment. It then turns to three particularly vexing
problems encountered in reconciling defense activities and environmental protection: finding criteria for resolving unavoidable
conflicts between national security and environmental protection, developing alternatives to uncritical judicial deference to
claims of defense necessity, and ensuring effective enforcement
of environmental laws against the federal government. While the
book outlines the contours of these problems, my purpose here
is to explore their complexities in somewhat greater detail.
Throughout, this Review will concentrate on DOE's experiences
to underscore Dycus' ideas and more fully explore their ramifications. Finally, the Review highlights what I take to be the fundamental, albeit counterintuitive, lesson of the defenseenvironment conflict: The defense establishment can become a
leader in environmental stewardship. The needed changes are
already underway. As Dycus would surely agree, these efforts
not only deserve broader public recognition and support, but
such support is essential if they are to continue.
I
THE BOOK

National Defense and the Environment aims primarily at
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newcomers to the intersection of national security law and environmental law. It includes brief, clear overviews of relevant statutes and caselaw (in fact, despite its specialized focus, the book
makes a handy survey of environmental law generally) and crisp
descriptions of some of the specific situations that implicate
those laws. Even experienced environmental lawyers will find
the book an invaluable roadmap for this extremely wide-ranging
and often murky subset of environmental regulation. Dycus
thoughtfully includes a catalogue of leading environmental
cases, as well as lists of relevant agencies and a guide to nongovernmental organizations that are active in this area. Together
with the citations to specific cases and general works in the text,
these features provide an excellent introduction to the law of national security and environmental protection.
A.

Subject Matter

National Defense and the Environment addresses a problem
of critical importance to the nation. Environmental impacts of
defense activities are as widespread as the defense establishment
itself, which is to say that they reach every comer of the United
States. DOD and DOE operate on a grandiose scale, employing
about 1.5 million men and women in uniform, 1.7 million more
in the reserves, and many more civilians.7 DOE alone employs

over 100,000 civilians.'

The resulting air emissions, water dis-

charges, and production of solid industrial and household waste
are typical of analogous civilian activities, 9 but the military produces them in massive quantities.
In addition, defense activities create highly unconventional
environmental hazards. Unexploded and surplus ordnance (pp.
99-100), millions of gallons of liquid waste that is both extremely
corrosive and highly radioactive 0 (pp. 110-12), chemical weap7. For an accessible account of the size of the U.S. military, see William Greider,
Fortress America. ROLLING STONE, July 10-24, 1997 at 61, 61-72, 136-38.
8. See COMPLEX CLEANUP, supra note 4, at 15; Carmen E. MacDougall, Letters to
the Editor: We're Not Going Anywhere But Forward,WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1996, at A23
(MacDougall is the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Communication, at DOE).

9. For example, the environmental impacts of berthing a nuclear submarine
(pp. 18-19) are much like a commercial docking venture. The local ecosystem must
be cleared and dredged and the nearby communities are created or disrupted. Compare Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817, 822, 828-30 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (the source of the case study), with Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 872,
876-80 (1st Cir. 1985) (Sears Island harbor and causeway project).
10. "For every pound of plutonium produced at the Hanford, Washington, site,
approximately 170 gallons of high-level liquid waste and 27,500 gallons of low-level
waste were generated. In all, the nuclear weapons complex has generated enough
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ons (pp. 66-68), excess nuclear warheads and weapons-grade
plutonium (pp. 122-24), and defoliant production residues (pp.
91-93) are just some of the more exotic materials that the defense agencies have produced and must manage.
In the United States, the DOD possesses, by one estimate,
about 13,000 potentially contaminated sites at 172 installations.'1 Estimates of the total environmental compliance costs
DOE owns
for these DOD facilities reach $30 billion. 2
2,300,000 acres of land, making it the fourth largest landowner
in the United States.' 3 One facility, the Nevada Test Site, is
larger than the state of Rhode Island. There are about 14,000
separate contaminated locations at 137 DOE facilities.1 4 The federal government spends between $5 and 6 billion each year on
the DOE's EM program, 5 the office of DOE that carries out its
cleanup activities. Estimates of the total cost of cleaning up the
entire weapons complex range from $146 billion1

lion,

7

depending on the scope of work."

6

to $350 bil-

By way of comparison,

radioactive waste to cover 515 football fields three feet deep." Pamela Murphy, Coming Clean: The Public's Evolving Role in Nuclear Waste Cleanup, NAT'L VOTER, Mar.Apr. 1994, at 17.
11. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, CLEANING UP DEFENSE
INSTALLATIONS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 7 (1995) thereinafter CLEANING UP]. The problems
include both conventional contaminants like petroleum and industrial solvents, and
unconventional items like unexploded ordnance. See id. at 10- 11. See generally
Richard A. Wegman & Harold G. Bailey, Jr., The Challenge of Cleaning Up Military
Wastes When U.S. Bases are Closed, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 865 (1994) (describing the
scope of and legal issues raised by the closure of DOD bases).
12. See CLEANING UP, supra note 11, at 18; see also AMERICAN STATISTICAL INDEX
1995, DEPI " OF DEFENSE EXEcUTIVE SUMMARY 9 (1995) (estimating an annual budget of
$5 billion through 1999, somewhat less than half of which is clean-up funding).
13. See CLOSING THE CIRCLE, supra note 4, at 2; U.S. DEPI OF ENERGY, STRATEGIC
PLAN, WORKING DRAFT 1 (1997) [hereinafter DOE STRATEGIC PLAN]. For a vivid description of the size of the Nuclear Weapons Complex, see COMPLEX CLEANUP, supra
note 4, at 3-6, 15-20.
14. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, PROPOSED BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT [FY 19961: CREATING OPPORTUNrIY AND ENCOURAGING RESPONSIBILITY 7991 (1995). DOE puts the number at 134. See DEPI " OF ENERGY, ACCELERATING
CLEANUP: PATHS TO CLOSURE C-3 (1998) [hereinafter PATHS TO CLOSURE].
15. As a measure of scale, this is twice the annual public and private expenditures on non-federal Superfund clean-ups and nearly the equivalent of EPA's entire
annual budget. See KATHERINE N. PROBST & MICHAEL H. McGoVERN, LONG-TERM
STEWARDSHIP AND THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX: THE CHALLENGE AHEAD viii (1998).
16. See PATHS TO CLOSURE, supra note 14, at 2-5.
17. See DEP'T OF ENERGY, 1996 BASELINE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT REPORT,
EXECumVE SUMMARY 1 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 BEMR EXECUnvE SUMMARY].
18. The terms "complete" and "clean-up" are somewhat euphemistic in this context. Current plans hope to finish the bulk of the clean-up in ten years at a substantially lower life-cycle cost of $117 billion, but numerous significant projects will take
longer (for example, the tanks at Hanford), and residual groundwater treatment and
environmental monitoring will continue long after that. Moreover, "clean" does not
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this figure is larger than all of the orphan sites that the Superfund must remedy. 19

Dycus' subject also applies beyond military facilities. The
environmental problems of the defense establishment mirror
problems in other segments of industry, but on a much grander
scale. When toxicologists want to observe rare, long-term health
effects like the chemical induction of cancer, they typically administer the chemical in question to hundreds of rats or other
animals at high doses, on the theory that such an onslaught will
reveal, at discernible levels and in a short period of time, what
would otherwise be difficult or impossible to detect.2 ° DOE is like
a large-scale, high-dose study of environmental remediation.
What might take tens or hundreds of private facilities to observe
is laid out in graphic detail in the massive EM program. For example, the problem, shared by all cleanup sites, of accounting
for the risks of remediation activities themselves (such as excavation of contaminated soil, transportation of waste, and treatment of hazardous substances) is magnified by the sheer length
of time that remediation activities will take at DOE sites. The
actuarial hazards of such sustained construction and transportation activities rival the hazards of the contamination and waste
itself; indeed, some risks will increase in the short term at DOE
sites.2" Likewise, DOE's need to manage long-lived radionuclides
necessarily mean that the area is freely releasable to the public; for the many sites at
which some contamination remains (either in situ or in a disposal facility), long-term
stewardship activities must continue indefinitely. See PATHS TO CLOSURE, supra note
14, at 1-6 to 1-7.
19. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE TOTAL COSTS OF CLEANING UP
NONFEDERAL SUPERFUND SITES ix-x (1994). The Superfund is the source of money created by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) to cover the cost of cleaning up abandoned hazardous waste disposal
sites. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1994) (establishing the Superfund).
20. The appropriateness of this methodology is a matter of controversy, but it
dominates cancer bioassays. See John S. Applegate, The Perils of UnreasonableRisk:
Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLuM. L. REV. 261,
286 (1991).
21. See CONSORTIUM FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RISK EVALUATION (CERE), INTERIM RISK
REPORT: HEALTH AND ECOLOGICAL RISKS AT THE U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY'S NUCLEAR
WEAPONS COMPLEX: A QUALITATIVE EVALUATION 5-1 to 5-4 (1995) [hereinafter CERE]: 1
OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEP'T OF ENERGY, RISKS AND THE RISK DEBATE:

(1995); John S. Applegate & Steven M. Wesloh, Short Changing Short-Term Risk: A Study of Superfuind
Remedy Selection, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 269, 277-296 (1998) (discussing federal facilities). Dycus addresses the point at pp. 113-16. In many ways, the real issue for
DOE is not risk reduction per se, because off-site and even on-site risks are fairly
modest in their current configuration since they are largely isolated from the public.
Rather, the lack of long-term stability and the enormous expense of maintaining the
current configuration drives the clean-up.
SEARCHING FOR COMMON GROUND, "THE FIRST STEP," DRAFT 50-53
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raises the as yet lurking problem of long-term stewardship of
contaminated sites (pp. 114-22)."2 The Superfund and hazardous waste statutes have a thirty-year horizon for managing most
sites, including those where the contamination is merely isolated
in place 2 3 - a very small portion of the 24,000-year half-life of
plutonium to say nothing of uranium's 4.5 billion-year half-life.
Even the quixotic 10,000-year planning horizon for the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for transuranic waste covers less than
half of the time until only half of the plutonium in it will have
disappeared.
Superfund sites confront similar risks of remediation activities and difficulties of long-term stewardship, with very little legal
or policy guidance. While some DOD and DOE materials pose
special risks to remediation workers, others are identical to those
regularly encountered at civilian Superfund sites. For the latter,
the real difference between civilian and military facilities is that
of scale- one can ignore worker risks at many individual Superfund sites, but not at sites like Hanford or Savannah River.
Otherwise, similarities abound between military and civilian
cleanup efforts. Asbestos, lead, and dioxins are not plutonium,
but the risks associated with their removal or destruction are
nevertheless highly controversial issues for the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).24 Likewise, the idea of restricted (or
sacrifice) zones may seem limited to areas adjacent to high-level
radioactive waste storage (pp. 80-81, 116) or the intensely radioactive canyon buildings used for plutonium processing,25 but it is
hard to know how else to characterize hazardous waste disposal
facilities or Superfund sites at which contamination has been left
in situ.2 6 In sum, developing law and policy to cope with defense
22. See generally John S. Applegate and Stephen Dycus, Institutional Controls or
Emperor's Clothes? Long-Term Stewardship of the Nuclear Weapons Complex, 28
ENVrL. L. REP. 10631 (1998).
23. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.117, 265.117 (1996). The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9621(d) (1994), incorporates the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1994).
24. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 12-19 (1993) (discussing asbestos removal); RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS
IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathon B. Wiener
eds., 1995); Frank B. Cross, ParadoxicalPerils of the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 53
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851, 898-902 (1996) (discussing asbestos, lead, and Superfund).
25. The canyons at Hanford and Savannah River are enormously long and tall
buildings in which the intensely radioactive, irradiated uranium fuel rods from production reactors were dissolved in acid and the newly created plutonium chemically
separated from the uranium and other new isotopes. The radiation in these canyons
is so intense that they have been remotely operated since the first one was built at
Hanford during the Second World War. See LINKING LEGACIES, supra note 4, at 174.
26. See generally Susan C. Borinsky, The Use of Institutional Controls in Super-
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problems will teach us how to cope with environmental problems
generally. More bluntly, if we can resolve the clean-up problems
of the defense establishment, we can resolve practically any-

thing.
B.

Organization

National Defense and the Environment is organized along
functional lines. Dycus first examines areas of military activity
that raise familiar environmental issues like environmental
planning (principally the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA))27 ; prospective pollution control (for example, the Clean
Air Act 2" and Clean Water Act 2"); and the clean-up of past pollution (RCRA3 ° and CERCLA3 1). He then turns to concerns that are
peculiarly military, including base closings, the law of war, judicial deference to the claimed needs of national security, and governmental liability for environmental harm. The substantive
chapters are framed by an introduction and conclusion that explain the author's view that military preparedness and environmental protection can coexist and that present his call to enforce
that coexistence through full compliance with existing environmental laws. Taken as a whole, however, the book concentrates
less on argument than on identifying and analyzing key areas of
conflict. Each chapter is written clearly, relies heavily on illustrative cases, and covers the topic as thoroughly as a survey can.
There are ample notes that, together with the appendices, allow
the interested reader to pursue a particular topic in more detail.
The chapter on environmental protection in wartime illustrates this approach. As Dycus recognizes, the idea that environmental protection should be any part of combat seems counterintuitive- I pictured Berke Breathed's Greenpeace crew 2 in

fund and Similar State Laws, 7 FORDHAM ENVL. L.J. 1. 2-3 (1995) (exploring "the potential use of institutional controls as a means of encouraging voluntary remediation
of contaminated sites"); David F. Coursen, Institutional Controls at Superfund Sites,
23 ENVrL. L. REP. 10279 (1993) (discussing institutional controls in CERCLA cases);
Jeffrey Spear, Remedy Selection Under CERCLA and Our Responsibilities to Future
Generations,2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 117, 142-44 (1993) (discussing EPA's use of risk
assessment analysis in the remedy selection process and the protection it offers to
future generations).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4347 (1994).
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
29. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939e (1994).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
32. BERKE BREATHED, PENGUIN DREAMS AND STRANGER THINGS 12-14 (1985)
("Bloom County" comic strip episode).
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the Pentagon's War Room- yet he makes a convincing case that
environmental protection is a relevant and practical consideration in military planning and operations.3 3 The environment is
certainly an element of a nation's national security, as a resource
and a national symbol, and thus constitutes a potential military
target (pp. 2-4). Military strategists must protect their own environmental resources and will inevitably consider whether to destroy their enemies', for example, by fouling Saudi desalinization
plants (as actually happened in the Persian Gulf War) or by destroying the Aswan High Dam on the Nile (an action that would
create a tidal wave inundating much of Egypt's population and
cultural heritage). Thus, in the law of war, limitations on attacking noncombatants and nonmilitary targets are of great
practical importance to the environment, as are limitations on
weapons that would cause widespread environmental devastation.
Dycus points out that military operations are not ad hoc responses to particular situations, but the result of extensive
planning and training that occurs over long periods of time.
Contents of plans and training, as well as operational rules of
engagement, are subjected to extensive review from many different angles, including legal perspectives, and there is simply no
reason that environmental factors cannot be included in such
reviews (pp. 145-48).' Such review would preclude, for example,
the indiscriminate use of nuclear weapons to destroy minor targets that could be removed without the devastating environmental effects of an atomic blast."5 On the ground, soldiers
"'fight the way [they] are trained'" (p. 148) (quoting a highranking Air Force officer). Since training already includes in-

33. This issue is explored in depth in a recently published symposium hosted by
the U.S. Naval War College. See PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED
CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES (Richard J. Grunawalt et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES]; see also Judith G. Gardam, Energy and the Law
of Armed Confict, 15 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 87 (1997) (discussing legal
limitations on targeting energy production facilities in light of the collateral effects on
the environment and civilian populations).
34. To give an apt historical example, Secretary of War Henry Stimson rejected
the use of the atomic bomb on Kyoto, contrary to the advice of many of his generals,
because he believed that destruction of the ancient capital and religious center would
do irreparable cultural harm that would poison post-war relations with a defeated
Japan. See RICHARD RHODES, THE MAKING OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 640-41 (1986); see
alsoGAR ALPEROvrrz, THE DECISION TO USE THE ATOMIC BOMB AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF
AN AMERICAN MYTI 531-32 (1995) (noting other reasons for not bombing Kyoto).

35.

See

STANSFIELD TURNER, CAGING THE NUCLEAR GENIE: AN AMERICAN CHALLENGE

FOR GLOBAL SECURITY 7-9, 74-75 (1997) (giving examples of overuse of nuclear weapons in war planning).
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doctrination on the limits of legitimate activities (for example,
treatment of prisoners and noncombatants), Dycus convincingly
argues that unnecessary environmental damage can also be
controlled by the same means.
Organizing the book by activity has some drawbacks, the
principal one being that some important topics end up scattered
throughout the book. This scattering is especially true of procedural topics like enforcement, and it leads to some repetition.
The structure also makes it hard to use the book as a treatise or
encyclopedia on cross-cutting issues in defense and the environment. Citizen suits are a case in point. They are mentioned
several times in connection with a number of topics and a number of statutes and are also dealt with in some detail in the
chapter on judicial enforcement (pp. 159-69). Nowhere, however,
does the book provide a comprehensive treatment of the subject.
In addition, the book covers some subtopics, like standing, in
ample detail, while shortchanging others of equal importance,
like preclusion of citizen suits by EPA action. No organization is
perfect, of course, but a set of q.v. or see also footnotes in addition to the index would be a great help.
On the other hand, the book's functional approach gives the
reader a good sense of the impact of the law on actual military
operations.3 6 It also provides a healthy reminder to lawyers that
environmental laws, for all their comprehensiveness and complexity, are secondary to military (or, for that matter, industrial)
needs in shaping activities. Organizing by activity is also enormously helpful for newcomers to the subject, the intended audience of the book, who will naturally look first to the activity that
concerns them- excessive overflights of a neighborhood from an
Air Force base (pp. 150-51), for example, or pollution of streams
by a nuclear weapons production facility (pp. 63-65)- rather
than to the legal framework. The functional organization allows
the author to bring to bear on a particular situation the bewildering array of statutes that apply to defense activities. One can
only admire the clarity with which Dycus explains legal issues
from the Safe Drinking Water Act 37 to the Tucker Act 8 (which
provides jurisdiction for non-tort claims against the federal government), from the unitary executive doctrine (holding that one
36. This tack was also taken with great success in another recent book on environmental law. See SusTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: INTEGRAING NATURAL RESOURCE
AND POLLUION ABATEMENT LAW FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY (Celia Campbell-Mohn

ed., 1993).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300fto 300J-18 (1994).
38. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1491 (1994).
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element of the executive branch cannot sue another in federal
court) to the National Historic Preservation Act, 39 and from the
law of war to the law of standing. By concentrating on activities
and cases, the organization of National Defense and the Environment serves a broad readership well.
II
THREE CHALLENGES

A good book raises as many questions as it answers, and National Defense and the Environment is no exception. Dycus' underlying position is that defense activities should be subject to
existing environmental laws on the same terms as other entities,
unless an exemption or waiver is expressly sought and its necessity publicly explained (pp. 2-4, 185-90).4o Such a regime, Dycus
believes, would improve considerably the present degree of environmental protection while assuring military preparedness. As a
survey, the book does not explore this prescription in great detail
and leaves many issues regarding its implementation unaddressed. This Review therefore continues by describing three
particularly difficult obstacles to environmental protection in the
military sphere and suggests some avenues to follow in overcoming them. These obstacles include real conflicts between
defense and the environment; excessive judicial deference to
claims of national security; and a lack of enforcement of environmental laws against defense agency facilities.
A.

Real Conflicts

Dycus asserts that "with rare exceptions, we can maintain a
strong, effective defense without... destroying our natural resources" (p. 185). In keeping with this position, most case studies in the book feature illusory or exaggerated conflicts in which
the government refused to take relatively painless actions that
would have avoided the problems. One particularly unnecessary
conflict arose over the use of Wendover Air Force Base to shuttle
troops back from the Persian Gulf region (pp. 150-51). While the
39. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 to 470x-6 (1994).
40. "Many of the rules... needed to reconcile national defense with environmental protection will be found in the United States environmental laws" (p. 3). A list
of additional reforms can be found at pp. 187-94. Interestingly, the concluding
speaker at the U.S. Naval War College symposium took a similar position with respect
to protection of the environment under the internationallaw of warfare. See John
Norton Moore, Concluding Remarks, in INTERNATIONAL LAw STUDIES, supra note 33, at
628. Moore concludes that the real problem is enforcement of existing international
law against outlaw states. See id. at 634-36.
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base's neighbors raised no objections when the base was being
used to build up forces (they willingly acquiesced, in other
words, to genuine military necessity), the Air Force, for no apparent reason other than its convenience, continued twenty-four
hour a day flights in and out of the base long after any urgency
was over. Refusals in other non-emergency situations to prepare
environmental impact statements (pp. 19-20) or to obtain permits (pp. 46-47, 63-65) are similarly unnecessary conflicts. National defense may ultimately require that the activity go forward, but security is hardly threatened by a deliberate
decisionmaking process.
It is clear, however, that real conflicts will arise, as Dycus
acknowledges, either in the context of military preparedness, the
use of especially dangerous materials (for example, long-lived radionuclides and chemical weapons), or the need for secrecy.4 1
Moreover, some of the conflicts that the case studies present as
unnecessary in fact raise serious questions. For example, there
is a conflict between the need to dispose of defense nuclear waste
and the long-term certainty of environmental protection. On the
one hand lies what can reliably be predicted- which is to say,
not a lot- about the hydrologic and geologic behavior of engineered facilities and the environment over tens of thousands of
years.4 2 On the other hand lie the extremely long half-lives of
some of the nuclear wastes that are slated for disposal in geologic repositories such as DOE's WIPP and Yucca Mountain facilities. Dycus is justifiably skeptical of assurances of long-term
stability, but he does not acknowledge fully the lack of a clearly
better path forward (pp. 119-21). 4" Decentralized dry cask stor41. The converse is also sometimes the case. Dycus convincingly explains that
the apparently obvious conflict between the planning of military operations, even ongoing military operations, and environmental protection can be resolved, at least procedurally (p. 146) (noting that DOD lawyers participated in targeting meetings during
the Persian Gulf War).
42. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RETINING HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
DISPOSAL 23-28 (1990); see also DOUGLAS EASTERLING & HOwARD KUNREUTHER, THE
DILEMMA OF SITING A HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE REPOSITORY (1995); Luther J. Carter
& Thomas H. Pigford, Getting Yucca Mountain Right, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Mar.Apr. 1998, at 56 (advocating improved techniques for geologic disposal). On the
problem of prediction, see generally J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the
Law in Modem Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Dininishing Returns and IncreasingRisks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C.
DAVIs L. REV. 405, 444-49 (1997) (discussing the nonlinear and hence unpredictable
development of technology).
43. Thus he should avoid the loaded term "sacrifice zone" to describe the immediate vicinity of the proposed repositories. The term misleadingly implies that other
solutions to high-level radioactive waste storage exist that would not create a zone of
danger around them. The National Academy of Sciences reports "a strong worldwide
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age of spent fuel (the resolution of choice among many environmentalists) will require monitoring and maintenance for an extended period of time, the regular replacement of the casks
(which at present are licensed for only 100 years), and keeping
the waste scattered at many generator sites. 4 Dycus worries
about future generations that may be exposed to waste in Yucca
Mountain or WIPP (pp. 113-22),4 5 but fails to acknowledge the
risks faced by future generations who must live close to, monitor, and repackage the waste in the dry cask storage scenario.4 6
The point is not that geologic isolation is necessarily the best answer to high-level waste disposal, but that a real conflict4 7 exists
between the need for disposal of defense nuclear waste and the
consensus [in the scientific community] that the best, safest long-term option for
dealing with [high-level waste] is geological isolation," i.e., a repository like WIPP or
Yucca Mountain. RETHINKING HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE, supra note 42.
44. See EASTERLING & KUNREUTHER, supra note 42, at 20-21. DOE was directed
to explore this option in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1016110169 (1994). For advocacy of dry cask or monitored retrievable storage, see K.S.
SHRADER-FRECHETI'E, BURYING UNCERTAINTY: RISK AND THE CASE AGAINST GEOLOGICAL
DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE (1993); ARJUN MAKHkJANI & SCOrT SALESKA, HIGH-LEVEL
DOLLARS, LoW-LEVEL SENSE 105-08, 125-26 (1992); James Flynn et al., Overcoming
Tunnel Vision: Redirecting the U.S. High-Level Nuclear Waste Program,ENVIRONMENT,
Apr. 1997, at 27-29; Arjun Makhijani, The Needless Yucca Mountain Rush of 1998,
SCI. FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION, May 1997, at 1. For a contrary view, see Luther J.
Carter, It's Time to Lay this Waste to Rest: There's Not Going to be a Perfect Site for
Disposing of Spent ReactorFuel, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 13; Chris
G. Whipple, Can Nuclear Waste Be Stored Safely at Yucca Mountain? SCI. AM., June
1996, at 72. For a discussion of the difficulties of monitored retrievable storage
(MRS) as an environmental justice issue, see Noah Sachs, The MescaleroApache Indians and Monitored Retrievable Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Study in Environmental Ethics, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 641 (1996). For articles in response, see id. at
673-723. See also EASTERLING & KUNREUTHER, supra note 42, at 69-80 (describing
the attempt to site the MRS facility).
45. The extent of this risk is the subject of intense debate. See Whipple, supra
note 44, at 78-79 (answering "yes" to his question "Can Nuclear Waste Be Stored
Safely at Yucca Mountain?"). But see Richard A. Kerr, A Hint of Unrestat Yucca Mountain, 279 SCi. 2040 (1998) (reporting new evidence of geologic instability in the area).
46. Shrader-Frechette recognizes this problem, but finds solutions for the MRS
option while rejecting similar solutions for geologic disposal.
See SHRADERFRECHEIE, supra note 44, at 182-212, 226-27, 232, 244-45. Her approach is criticized by David Okrent, Comment. Pigford, Shrader-Frechette & the NRC Report on
Yucca Mountain, 9 RISK: HEALTh, SAFETY & ENV~r 1, 4, 6 (1998). Indeed, the controversial attempt to site an MRS facility on Mescalero Apache land was triggered by the
angry local response to the proposal to store Northern States Power Company's spent
fuel at the Minnesota reactor that generated it. See, e.g., Luther J. Carter, The Mescalero Option (Storageof Nuclear Waste at Mescalero Apache Tribe Reservation in New
Mexico), BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 11.
47. This is a real conflict, despite the fact that the military activities that produced the waste took place in the past, because we cannot now alter the military
judgment that this waste production was necessary, even though a full appreciation
at the time of the environmental consequences might have modified the amounts or
methods of production.
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long-term certainty of environmental protection.4
Dycus approaches real conflicts along the lines of NEPA, in
that he would rely primarily on a procedural command to explain
governmental actions publicly and secondarily on a substantive
command to minimize environmental harm in conformance with
existing environmental laws.4 9 Specifically, Dycus argues that in
"deciding when such sacrifices are really necessary," we need "a
settled procedure for determining when we must choose between
environmental protection and national defense," including a
"clear articulation of the issues and evaluation of the stakes" and
"who will be entrusted with the fateful decision and how he or
she will go about making it" (p. 3). Thus, national security waivers of existing standards are to be open and explicit. Many environmental statutes contain express waiver provisions for national security, but they are almost never invoked.'0 The result
is that accommodation goes underground, reappearing as excessive judicial deference, exaggerated secrecy claims, and other
subterfuges.
Transparency would no doubt reveal cases of mere convenience masquerading as military necessity. Disclosure has always
been NEPA's strength (pp. 12-14)."' However, NEPA has never
been a prescription for resolving conflicts between federal activities and the environment. Its limitations for enforcing substantive environmental protection are well known,5 2 yet Dycus' ap48. See RETHINKING HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL, supra note 42, at 3,
23-28, 35 (criticizing unrealistic expectations of the long-term accuracy of environmental modeling).
49. The District of Columbia Circuit held in Calvert Cliffs' CoordinatingComnm,
Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112-15 (D.C. Cir. 1971), that section
101 of NEPA imposes a very flexible substantive command to minimize environmental
harm where it would be consistent with the other agency goals, while section 102 imposes a mandatory obligation to analyze and consider environmental effects in every
major decision. More recently, the Supreme Court in Strycker's Bay Neighborhood
Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (per curiam), and Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989), accepted the basic outline of Cal
vert Cliffs', but cast doubt on the existence of any enforceable substantive command,
other than that environmental considerations are a relevant factor in decisions.
50. A recent example involved the ongoing litigation concerning hazardous materials used and disposed of at the super-secret Groom Lake facility in Nevada. President Clinton exempted the Air Force's operations at Groom Lake from compliance
with RCRA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (1994). See Presidential Determination
on Classified Information Concerning the Air Force's Operating Location Near Groom
Lake, Nevada, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,921, 56,921 (1998).
51. Dycus advanced a version of this argument in NEPA Secrets, supra note 2, at
300 (arguing that NEPA's disclosure and analysis require agencies to make deliberate, publicly accountable decisions).
52. The best known exposition of NEPA's limitations is Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 239 (1973).
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proach replicates NEPA's qualified substantive mandate53:
If environmental trade-offs must be made in the interest of
national security, or if the environment is to be placed at risk,
we want to be informed in advance. We want to be able to
say that the environmental harm was unavoidable, that there
were no viable alternatives, and that we planned it that way
(p. 11).
This philosophy is a sensible version of having it both ways (pp.
185-86), but it does not describe the standard that should be
applied to resolve actual conflicts. It does not tell us when a
harm is "unavoidable," whether an alternative is "viable," or what
kind of injury is "unnecessary."
The fundamental substantive problem raised by the intersection of defense activities and environmental protection is thus
the legal standard that ought to be used to adjust actual conflicts between them. Existing statutory waiver provisions offer no
real clues to the applicable standard. Such provisions refer to
the "paramount interest of the United States, " ", which is as
vague a prescription as one can easily imagine. Thus, even if the
decision and waiver processes are perfectly transparent, there
are no substantive standards to apply.55 Characterizing the environmental harm as "unavoidable" or instead as the "needless
destruction of natural resources" (pp. 3-4) simply begs the question. Unavoidability and needlessness are functions of the importance of the military activity and the alternatives to the chosen method of implementing it. Consider the use of ozonedepleting halons to purge jet fighter fuel tanks between missions
(p. 54). Their use clearly responds to the genuine military need
to avoid explosive conditions in the fuel tanks of fighter aircraft
that must be quickly refueled between sorties. How should we
resolve the conflict until effective substitutes are found? What
criteria should be used? Are alternative technologies available
(for example, helium is used to purge the Space Shuttle's fuel
tanks56 ), and if so, how much risk should we impose on fighter

53. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1994) ([Ulse all practicable means, consistent with
other essential considerations of national policy .. ").
54. The statutory provisions are collected at p. 232. The executive order mandating federal compliance with pollution laws contains the same exemption. See
Exec. Order No. 12,088 § 1-701, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,707 (1978).
55. Having a standard to apply is crucial to obtaining judicial enforcement, another key element of Dycus' position. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413 (1971) (holding that agency decisions are not reviewable
where there is no "law to apply").
56. See generally JAMES E. MIELKE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE
FEDERAL HEUUM PROJECT: THE REACTION OVER AN INERT GAS (1996) (discussing the
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pilots if they are less effective? How much cost should we impose on taxpayers if they are more expensive?
The current debate over the management of excess plutonium poses a similar problem (pp. 122-24). DOE has decided
that it will dispose of some of the plutonium by blending it with
uranium to be used as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in commercial reactors. 57 Environmental and anti-nuclear groups believe that
this raises serious proliferation concerns. In addition, this solution creates more spent fuel, which is highly radioactive and
must be disposed of; it potentially exposes more people to plutonium, which is extraordinarily toxic; and it is a fuel for which
U.S. reactors are not currently equipped, which raises safety
concerns. 58 DOE responds that the MOX fuel option does not require reprocessing (the recovery of additional plutonium) and
that it is used by other countries, including Britain, France, and
Japan. 9 MOX, it is argued, makes productive use of a valuable
resource and parallels Russian efforts. The latter point supports
good diplomatic relations with Russia, on which long-term progress in nonproliferation depends. Clearly, environmental concerns can be met to some degree by choosing to immobilize plutonium instead of turning it into fuel, though, to complicate the
puzzle, the repository for the vitrified material would logically be
WIPP or Yucca Mountain, neither of which is favored by environmentalists. But, with all these competing considerations, the
legal question remains: What is the substantive standard that
should be applied to make this decision? When does the environment trump legitimate defense considerations?
The resolution of issues such as the use of halons and MOX
fuel is inevitably case-specific. Nevertheless, it should be possible to develop a structure of factors, preferences, conditions, and

federal helium program).
57. See Edwin S. Lyman, Weapons Plutonium: Just Can It (Disposing of Surplus
Weapons Plutonium), BULL. ATOM. SCIENTIS, Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 48, 48-52; Marvin
Miller & Frank von Hippel, Let's Reprocess the MOX Plan, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS,
July-Aug. 1997, at 15; Mike Moore, Plutoniunm The Disposal Decision, BULL. ATOM.
SCIE~nSTS, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 40, 40-48 (this issue includes articles for and against
the MOX fuel option). A similar concern with mixing military and commercial nuclear
facilities is raised by DOE's proposal to use a commercial power plant to produce
tritium (H3), an important component of nuclear weapons. See Erin Middlewood,
Going Nuclear: Your Utility Company May Soon Be Involved in Making Warheads, THE
PROGRESSrVE, June 1997, at 21.
58. See Charles D. Hollister & Steven Nadis, Burial of Radioactive Waste Under
the Seabed, Sc. AM., Jan. 1998, at 60, 60-6 1.
59. See generally DEP'T OF ENERGY, FACT SHEEr SURPLUS PLUTONIUM DISPOSITON
AND THE U.S. POuCY OF REPROCESSING (1997).
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proof that must be taken into account in each situation. 60 One
possibility would be to structure such decisions along the lines
of the As Low As is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA6 ) concept
used in the military and civilian nuclear industries. ALARA has
three elements: (1) quantitative ceilings on radiation exposure to
plant workers and to the general public that may never be exceeded; 62 (2) a general balancing standard for permissible exposures under those ceilings;' and (3) a continuing requirement to
minimize exposure whenever it is economically justified. While
the substantive bite of ALARA has been questioned by the
courts, 64 the framework could be utilized as a general substantive standard for reconciling environmental protection with defense needs, producing the following: 65 (1) certain types or degrees of harm would be simply out of bounds (for example,
deliberate off-site releases of highly toxic materials 6 ); (2) a balancing test, including detailed factors and their relative weights;
and (3) a continuing obligation to minimize environmental harm

60. Cf. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1781-86 (1975) (discussing the use of weighting factors to facilitate judicial enforcement of Congressional mandates).
61. Stated in full, ALARA stands for "'as low as is reasonably achievable'...
taking into account the state of technology ... the economics of improvements in relation to benefits to the public health and safety, and other societal and socioeconomic considerations, and in relation to the utilization of nuclear energy and licensed
materials in the public interest." NRC Standards for Protection Against Radiation, 10
C.F.R. § 20.1003 (1999). For a good overview of the development of the ALARA standard, see In re TMI (Three Mile Island), 67 F.3d 1103, 1108-12 (3d Cir. 1995).
62. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 20.1201, 20.1301 (1999). These levels have dropped dramatically over the years, due to advances in health physics and nuclear engineering.
See CLOSING THE CIRCLE, supra note 4, at 38.
63. The current nuclear safety balancing standard is described in In re General
Electric Co., 24 N.R.C. 325, 341 (1986) ("[R]adiological protection should be pursued
to reduce exposures to a point where any further reduction in risk would not justify
the effort required to accomplish it."). NRC regulations specify a cost-benefit ratio of
$1000 per man-rem averted. 10 C.F.R. pt. 50, app. I, § II.D (1999).
64. See, e.g., In re TMI, 67 F.3d at 1115 (characterizing the standard as 'vague");
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566, 582 (W.D. Okla. 1979), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (observing that the ALARA "standards are considered only to be guidelines").
65. This structure consciously parallels the three-part structure for remedy selection under CERCLA's National Contingency Plan, which creates a hierarchy of
nearly absolute "[threshold" requirements, "[pirimary balancing criteria," and finally
i[m]odifying criteria." See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430() (1999).
66. In the 1940s, DOE did Just this at Hanford to measure radionuclide transport, and DOD sponsored testing of enormous whole-body doses of radiation on terminally ill cancer patients. See DOE, Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments- Final Report ch. 8, 10 (1995) available at
<http://tis.en.doe.gov/ohre/roadmap/achm>; WHrrT HOUSE REPORT ON RADIATION
TESTING (1996).
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wherever feasible.67
Applying such a structure to the halon and plutonium disposition questions, the general prohibition might preclude actions that increaserisks, such as failing to purge tanks or disposition methods that result in a loss of physical control of
weapons-usable materials. The balancing criteria for both halons and plutonium might, in addition to the obviously relevant
considerations, emphasize a comparison to alternative actions
(for example, substitutes for halons or vitrification instead of
MOX fuel for plutonium) that would meet military needs. Some
form of cost-benefit and risk analysis would be appropriate in
this part of the structure. Finally, the obligation to minimize environmental harm wherever feasible should have teeth.6 9 It
should not be an answer to a proposed precaution to say that it
is not expressly required. If the precaution is feasible, it should
be taken, whether or not contemplated by the current regulations. With halons, for example, the appearance of a feasible alternative, perhaps helium, would result in an obligation to adopt
it. Other approaches to real conflicts between military preparedness and environmental protection are possible, of course, and
may be preferable to ALARA. National Defense and the Environment offers the source material for developing such approaches,
and it is to be hoped that it will stimulate others to undertake
this important task.
B.

JudicialDeference

The defense establishment is not exempted from any of the
major environmental laws (in fact, when Congress directly addresses the question, it uniformly includes defense activities),
but federal courts have allowed it to behave as though it were

67. The term "feasible" has a long career of high-profile administrative and judicial interpretation. It is generally taken to demand a high level of protection. See,
e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508-12 (1981); Industrial
Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 637-41, 667-68, 679-82,
717-20 (1980); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411
(1971).
68. There is precedent for emphasizing a comparative criterion in the Clean WaterAct. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (1994).
69. For critiques of aspirational commands in environmental legislation, see generally David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air
Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740 (1983); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Richard N. Pearson, Implementing FederalEnvironmental Policies: The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78
CoLUM. L. REv. 1429 (1978). On the other hand, the nuclear industry, operating under the ALARA standard since 1950, has continually reduced permitted exposure levels for workers. See CLOSING THE CIRCLE, supranote 4, at 38.
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exempt (pp. 16-19). This is the aspect of the intersection of the
environment and national security that Dycus finds most troubling. The excessive deference given by the federal judiciary to
claims of defense necessity is a recurrent theme in National Defense and the Environment (e.g., pp. 16-19, 60, 72, 154-58), and
it drives Dycus' central proposal for reform. He argues that the
courts should require consistently defense agencies to follow existing environmental rules and procedures to the same extent as
private entities. Procedural approaches to environmental regulation, like NEPA, will fail unless the actions in question receive
careful judicial scrutiny and unless there is a credible threat that
the activity will be halted if the procedures are not followed.
Moreover, uncritical deference undermines the thorough and
public examination of the competing claims that form the substantive content of a procedural approach like NEPA.
The courts' regular refusal to enjoin activities that they find
to be illegal provides the most concrete evidence of this pattern of
deference. To take one of several examples in the book, the Y- 12
facility at the Oak Ridge Reservation discharged millions of
pounds of mercury, known to be highly toxic, into a local stream
as part of the bomb-making process. While the court agreed that
DOE's failure to obtain permits for these discharges violated both
RCRA and the Clean Water Act, and even though DOE made no
effort to obtain the available national security waivers under either statute, the court refused to enjoin further discharges based
on the mere representation that the Y-12 plant was unique and
its operation militarily necessary (pp. 64-65). A more critical examination might well have asked whether continued discharges
were necessary to uninterrupted operation, whether uninterrupted operation was in fact critical to maintaining the nuclear
stockpile, whether the polluting processes were unavoidable, and
whether seeking a permit would really take an inordinately long
time.
Clearly, there are situations in which a court could justifiably find a violation of law but withhold injunctive relief. That is
the nature of equitable remedies. What troubles Dycus is not so
much the regularity with which this happens in defense cases, 0
but the uncritical manner in which the courts' equitable discretion is exercised. In the examples he cites, the courts applied no
specific criteria for determining when the defense concern
trumped the environmental, and they demanded no detailed
70. It is, after all, hard to think of a more compellitg case for finding that the equities favor the defendant than where an injunction would threaten national security.
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proof. This pattern is at odds with judicial behavior in parallel
contexts. As Dycus points out, a controversy's sensitivity and
the judiciary's lack of expertise in the underlying subject matter
have certainly given courts pause in other kinds of cases, but it
has hardly stopped them from taking the actions that they
deemed the law to require (p. 154). In non-defense environmental cases, the federal courts have not hesitated to ensure
that agencies had the full facts before them and that they thoroughly explained their choices.7
Courts in NEPA cases have
demanded that environmental impact statements be thorough
and that the agency's choices be rationally based upon them.7 2
In addition, courts have freely issued injunctions to vindicate
procedural requirements 3 and environmental goals, as in the
celebrated Snail Darter case.74 In non-environmental national
security cases, too, there is a tradition (albeit imperfectly adhered to'-) of close inquiry into the strength of federal claims of
76
national security. One has only to look at the Pentagon Papers
case (involving publication of a secret Pentagon history of the
Vietnam War) to find a skeptical reception to conclusory claims
of military necessity.
It is one thing to identify the problem of uncritical review and
quite another to find a cure. Where and how to draw the line
between appropriate and excessive deference severely challenges
the ability of the law to be prescriptive about the resolution of
complex problems. Any balancing test- whether it is issuing an
injunction or deciding how much environmental harm is necessary- is ultimately discretionary, and verbal formulas can only
circumscribe the exercise of discretion to a certain point. The
traditional techniques for adjusting judicial deference are to

71. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 249
(2d Cir. 1977). Several statutes now require an explanation of the agency's reasoning
and response to comments. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(6) (1994);
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a) (1994).
72. See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989).
73. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 504 (1st Cir. 1989).
74. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
75. In one such case, the Supreme Court accepted very generalized claims of the
needs of military discipline to uphold the Air Force's refusal to permit an officer who
practiced psychiatry in non-combat military hospitals to wear a yarmulke. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504-10 (1986).
76. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). On
the other hand, a district court enjoined publication of an article that revealed secrets
of hydrogen bomb construction. See United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F.
Supp. 990, 999-1000 (W.D. Wis. 1979), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir.
1979). The case was abandoned when the article was published elsewhere.
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mandate the consideration of certain factors,7 7 to indicate the
relative importance of the various factors,78 to allocate burdens of
proof and define their strictness, or to try to set a tone or "mood,"
as Justice Frankfurter once put it, 9 for the judicial inquiry. The
last is most applicable here, because Dycus is arguing that the
nominal law is fine but that the judicial approach is flawed.
Urging a more skeptical judicial attitude is by no means impractical. Congress has successfully communicated its preference for more searching reviews in regulatory statutes by
choosing "substantial evidence" instead of the "arbitrary, capricious" standard of review. 0 Recent reform proposals that would
add risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis requirements to
environmental regulation send a distinct message of hostility to
environmental controls. Alternatively, in the discovery context, a
showing of "particularized need" has been required in certain
cases to overcome a countervailing need for secrecy.8 ' ALARA
admittedly "involves highly subjective value judgments,8 2 but it
also expresses important preferences: while radiation exposures
must always be limited to "necessary" ones, exposures to the
general public must be "absolutely necessary."83 ALARA is a
clear mandate for courts to view justifications for public exposures very critically. Congress, in sum, has the tools to con77. For example, the court in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power
Commission, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958), sets out the standard factors for
determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction- irreparable harm to the
plaintiff, the plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits, the countervailing harm to
the defendant, and the public interest. Yet these factors obviously limit the issuing
court's discretion very little, especially if claims of irreparable harm are uncritically
accepted.
78. A more elaborate system of factors, with priorities and preferences built into
them, can be found in CERCLA remedy selection. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9621(b), 9621(d)
(1994), and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (1994). See Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1045-47 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (interpreting 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314).
79. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951).
80. See Applegate, supra note 20, at 326-27 (discussing the standard of review
under the Toxic Substances Control Act). Congress clearly intended the "substantial
evidence" standard in TSCA to mean searching review, and the courts have obliged.
Id.
81. A showing of particularized need is required for disclosure of grand Jury materials covered by FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218-24 (1979); see also John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation,
68 TEX. L. REv. 277, 313-14 (1989); Richard L. Marcus, The Perilsof Privilege: Waiver
and the Litigator,84 MICH. L. REv. 1605, 1647-55 (1986) (advocating use of the particularized need standard for discovery of privileged documents).
82. In re General Electric, 24 N.R.C. 325, 341 (1986); see also York Comm. for a
Safe Env't v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 527 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
83. 10 C.F.R. § 20.1(c) (1999).
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struct substantive policies that adjust real conflicts between national defense and the environment and also to ensure that its
policies are properly implemented.
C.

Enforcement

Dycus attributes the defense establishment's noncompliance
with environmental strictures not only to excessive judicial deference to claims of national security, but also to a weak enforcement system. Consequently, a third challenge that National
Defense and the Environment poses is fmding an effective outside' enforcer of environmental compliance by the defense agencies.8" In general, formalized agency decisions and other major
actions are not the problem in this regard, because the Administrative Procedure Act 86 and the National Environmental Policy
Act 87 provide avenues for individual citizens to enforce compliance with rulemaking procedures. While obtaining a complete
remedy under these statutes is difficult, as we have just seen,
the basic legal mechanism is in place."m To the extent that the
problem is an agency's failure to abide by applicable pollution
laws like the air, water, and hazardous waste acts, however, the
ability to enforce compliance is limited by the doctrines of the
unitary executive (pp. 158-59) and sovereign immunity (pp. 15960).89
84. Dycus does not seriously consider self-regulation as an appropriate answer.
DOE is partially self-regulated under the Atomic Energy Act, and its historical performance does not inspire confidence. A committee on self-regulation, chartered by
the Secretary of Energy, recently recommended the development of a system outside
regulation for virtually all aspects of DOE operations. See DEP'T OF ENERGY, REPORT
OF DEP'T OF ENERGY WORKING GROUP ON EXTERNAL REGULATION (1996).
85. Dycus is not alone in this concern. A substantial literature has grown up on
federal facilities' compliance with environmental laws. See, e.g., Melinda R. Kassen,
The Inadequacies of CongressionalAttempts to Legislate Federal Facility Compliance
with Environmental Requirements, 54 MD. L. REv. 1475 (1995): Steven A. Herman,
Environmental Cleanup and Compliance at Federal Facilities:An EPA Perspective, 24
ENVrL. L. 1097 (1994).
86. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994).
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(e) (1994).
88. An important exception, relevant to the DOE clean-up program, is remedy
selection under CERCLA. CERCLA broadly precludes judicial review of remedy selection decisions in all (not just defense or federal) cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)
(1994). For a description of the contours of preclusion and analyses of its wisdom,
see generally Michael P. Healy, The Effectiveness and Fairnessof Superfund's Judicial
Review Preclusion Provision, 15 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 271 (1995-96); John S. Applegate,
How to Save the National Priorities List from the D.C. Circuit-And Itself 9 J. NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 211 (1993-94); Michael P. Healy, JudicialReview and CERCLA
Response Actions: Interpretive Strategies in the Face of PlainMeaning, 17 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 1 (1993).
89. A related problem is the difficulty of imposing liability on federal agencies for

1999]
1.

NATIONAL DEFENSEAND THE ENVIRONMENT

The Unitary Executive

EPA is the natural candidate for external enforcement of the
pollution laws against the defense agencies, since EPA does exactly this with private parties. Its ability to do so is limited, how-

ever, because both EPA and the defense agencies are part of the
Executive Branch. The unitary executive policy of the Department of Justice posits that EPA cannot bring a judicial action
against another executive agency without the President's acquiescence, if at all.9° In accordance with this policy, Executive Order No. 12,08891 requires submission of internal Executive
Branch disputes to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
and Executive Order No. 12,14692 requires submission of legal

disputes to the Attorney General.

While the Federal Facility

Compliance Act of 199291 (FFCA) in effect abrogates the unitary
executive doctrine for RCRA, 94 a court called upon to adjudicate
such a claim in an enforcement action or in a citizen suit,

mindful of the independence of the coordinate branches of government, might still resist becoming entangled in the internal
dispute of another branch on the theory that such a dispute
does not constitute an Article III "case or controversy" or that it
constitutes a political question.9 5
In contrast to the FFCA, CERCLA provides for interagency
agreements in the event of a violation and gives EPA the lead in

remedy selection. 96 Moreover, even the FFCA requires negotiations leading to a consent order, and as a last resort, senior-level

environmental harms that they cause. This also raises sovereign immunity issues
(though different ones from state enforcement) and it is covered in Chapter 8 of NationalDefense and the Environment
90. The President may "supervise and guide [agencies in] their construction of
the statutes under which they act in order to secure that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which article 2 of the Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting
general executive power in the President alone." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
135 (1926).
91. 43 Fed. Reg. 47,707 (1978).
92. 44 Fed. Reg. 42,657 (1979).
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6939(c)-6939(e), 6908, 6965 (1994).
94. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903(15), 6961 (1994) (authorizing administrative actions
against federal agencies and making agencies of the United States "persons" subject
to suit).
95. See generally Adam Babich, Circumventing Laws: Does the Sovereign Have a
License to Pollute?, 6 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 28, 28 (1991) (discussing the D.O.J.'s
"vigorous campaign to insulate federal agencies from" antipollution laws).
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 6920(e)(4)(A) (1994). Exec. Order No. 12,580 § 10, 52 Fed.
Reg. 2923 (1987), slightly modifies Executive Order No. 12,088 for CERCLA purposes, requiring consultation with the agency (with OMB facilitation, if necessary)
before EPA reaches a final decision.
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consultation, before a binding order can be issued.9 7 Thus, instead of litigating against federal agencies, EPA must in practice
negotiate with them or seek arbitration by OMB or the Department of Justice. 98
EPA has negotiated compliance agreements at many federal
facilities, and their violation theoretically subjects the facility to
penalties. Even so, enforcement faces a significant financial obstacle in the Anti-Deficiency Act,9 9 which codifies the constitutional prohibition on spending unappropriated funds"°° and forbids federal officials from creating financial obligations in excess
of appropriations. Thus, a federal facility cannot be penalized
under a multi-year compliance or consent agreement unless
Congress in fact appropriates such funds in the subsequent
years- and Congress can simply decline to do so. Penalty
schedules in compliance agreements are, therefore, conditional
on the appropriation of funds to pay them (p. 158). This severely
weakens the ability of EPA to enforce aggressively environmental
laws.
Dycus advocates simply abandoning the unitary executive
policy and allowing EPA to seek judicial remedies (monetary and
injunctive) on the same basis as against private entities (pp. 18889). This may, in the final analysis, be the right solution, but it
poses some challenging problems. First, the unitary executive
policy is not, as the reader of National Defense and the Environment might conclude, simply a case of DOJ legerdemain. It implicates very real executive branch management and separation
of powers issues. 1 ' The heads of DOE, DOD, and EPA all report
directly to the President. While disagreement among agencies is
hardly unexpected (and even healthy, within limits), the President's responsibilities include the implementation of a coherent
policy on, among other things, the compliance of federal activities with environmental laws. At a practical level, the Depart-

97. See 42 U.S.C. § 6961(b) (1994). Even then, it may be doubted that the Department of Justice would, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, be willing to file or
pursue such a remedy, given its own adherence to the unitary executive doctrine.
98. See Stephen J. Darmody, Hazardous Waste Law for the Federal Employee
After the FederalFacility ComplianceAct of 1992: An Analysis of the Legal Framework,
40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 650, 651-52 (1993); Andrew Michael Gaydosh, The Superfund
FederalFacility Program: We Have Met the Enemy and It Is Us. NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T, Winter 1992, at 21.

99.

31 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
101. See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Unitary Executive and PresidentialControl
of Executive Branch Rulemaking, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 309 (1993) (arguing for plenary
presidential authority).
100.
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ment of Justice cannot be in the position of pressing contradictory legal arguments while representing different agencies in the
same litigation.10 2 More fundamentally, the President has good
among immediate suborreason to resist having policy disputes
03
dinates resolved by the judiciary. 1
Moreover, allowing one limb of the executive branch to punish another accomplishes nothing and may in fact be counterproductive. If EPA takes money away from DOE as a penalty,
what should be done with the money? If it goes to EPA for other
environmental activities or to the general Treasury fund, how do
we know that the new use of the money is more important than
the inadequate federal compliance or clean-up activity that has
been penalized?' °4 Indeed, the effect is likely to be perverse, because it will take money away from the defense program that
very much needs to be continuing its compliance or clean-up activities, since the offending defense program is in fact in need of
enhancement, not reduction. 0 5 Alternatively, if Congress, with a
few nasty words to the agency on the side, replaces the penalty
funds to ensure continuation of the environmental activities,
what has been accomplished?"0 ' The bottom line is that federal
102. See Richard Lazarus, In the Courts: Split Personality in FederalEnforcement,
ENVL. F., July-Aug. 1997, at 8.
103. The separation of powers argument is weakened, however, by the fact that
Congress regularly intervenes in the allocation of executive power by delegating decisionmaking authority to specific agency heads and not simply to the President. See
Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deteriorationof Regulatory Policy, 46
ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 29 (1994).
104. In fact, one might argue that under this scenario the courts would be in effect reprogramming Congressionally appropriated funds, which they may not do.
This problem, however, is presumably remediable by appropriate legislation.
105. It is said that Katharine Hepburn's father once received a letter from Bryn
Mawr College in which the dean expressed serious misgivings about his daughter's
continuation at Bryn Mawr in view of her apparent lack of seriousness about her
studies. Hepburn's father, a physician, replied that in his profession it was not customary to throw a sick patient out of the hospital. See BARBARA LEAMING. KATHARINE
HEPBURN

226 (1995).

106. Dycus suggests that appearance at accusatory hearings before Congressional
committees is a strong motivation to avoid the need to seek additional appropriations
to cover penalties (p. 159). That is no doubt true to a point, but hostile hearings are
very much the norm and senior officials surely come to regard them as unavoidable.
Cf Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of FederalEnvironmental Law, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 336-42, 355, 374 (1991) (documenting EPA's contentious relationship with its numerous oversight committees).
Apart from such tongue lashings, personnel consequences that would influence future behavior are unlikely. See, e.g., Margaret K. Minister, FederalFacilitiesand the
Deterrence Failure of Environmental Laws: The Case for Criminal Prosecution of Federal Employees, 18 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 137 (1994). Similar difficulties exist with
private firms. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling CorporateMisconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 687, 689-718
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agencies penalizing each other is a zero-sum game, assuming a
fixed or shrinking budget. If the target accounts are already devoted to useful activities, then a fine will reduce the amount of
that activity that takes place.
The foregoing difficulties demonstrate the complexity of intra-branch penalties; they are not, however, conclusive of the issue. To the extent that injunctive relief- forcing action- is
EPA's true goal in these situations, the zero-sum problem largely
disappears. In addition, even though the Department of Justice
is unlikely as a practical matter to agree to represent EPA
against another executive agency, abrogation or limitation of the
unitary executive could encourage the Justice Department to
fulfill its duty to support EPA's legitimate demands on other
agencies. In other words, DOJ could arbitrate inter-agency disputes with a clear eye on the goals of environmental statutes.
Inter-agency disputes and the unitary executive are difficult issues, and Dycus' treatment provides a foundation for more detailed study.
2.

Sovereign Immunity

If EPA's position is weakened by the unitary executive doctrine, then perhaps the states can be relied upon as the principal
enforcers of environmental laws. Indeed, the states may be the
preferable enforcers due to their independence from Presidential
control and their strong incentive to protect their territorial air,
water, and other natural resources. One need only follow the
Army's dogged efforts (ultimately thwarted by the Tenth Circuit °7 ) to keep the state of Colorado out of the remediation of Basin F, a witches' brew of materials used to produce chemical and
incendiary weapons at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal (pp. 91-93),
to see what a difference the Army thought having a state regulator would make.
Most major federal environmental statutes encourage the
states to assume primary enforcement responsibilities by enacting their own air, water, and solid waste laws, and most of the
states have done so. Under the principle of sovereign immunity,
which is based on the Supremacy Clause," 8 states cannot enforce their laws against the United States without its consent.
Therefore, to ensure federal facilities' compliance, the Clean Wa(1997) (discussing the difficulties of deterring agents' wrongful conduct by imposing
liability on their principals).
107. See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993).
108.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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ter Act, Clean Air Act, and RCRA expressly require federal facili9
ties to comply with all federal, state, interstate, and local laws."

Courts have readily concluded that the substantive standards in
these statutes apply to federal facilities, but because waivers of
immunity are construed strictly in favor of the sovereign,1 10 the
Supreme Court has construed the statutory language narrowly.11 1 In Ohio v. Departmentof Energy (a case involving DOE's

Fernald facility), the Court interpreted the federal facilities sections of RCRA and the Clean Water Act to permit "coercive" fines
to ensure future compliance, but not "punitive" fines for past
violations. 1 2 The Court further held that the state could not use
the statutes' citizen suit provisions to obtain punitive civil penalties against the United States.
Congress lost no time in rejecting the Ohio decision. The
Federal Facility Compliance Act (FFCA) provides the unequivocal
waiver in RCRA that the Supreme Court had thought was lacking. The FFCA subjects federal agencies to civil frnes, both punitive and coercive, waives federal employees' immunity from
criminal prosecution, allows states to choose among enforcement
mechanisms, and permits states to pursue RCRA claims in a
citizen suit." 3 Although the FFCA is a powerful tool, it is limited
to RCRA, and so the rationale of the Ohio case may remain in
effect for waivers in other statutes." 4 Due to the many permutations of waivers and state enforcement actions, uncertainty is
likely to persist in this area for some time, resulting in scatter109. See 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1994) (water); 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1994) (air); 42
U.S.C. § 6961(a) (1995) (RCRA). CERCLA provides that federal facilities must comply
with "[state laws regarding enforcement," 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4) (1995), and state law
is incorporated into remedy selection. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2) (1995). See generally Barry Breen, Federal Supremacy and Sovereign Immunity Waivers in Federal Environmental Law, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. 10326 (1985).
110. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685-86 (1983); McMahon v.
United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951).
111. See, e.g., Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 181-99 (1976) (Clean Air Act does
not subject federal installations to state permit requirements); EPA v. California State
Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976) (federal facilities not required to
pay charges incident to a state permit program under Clean Water Act).
112. 503 U.S. 607, 621-23 (1992).
113. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903(15), 6961 (1994). See generally Darmody, supra note
98.
114. Compare Sierra Club v. Lujan, 972 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1992) (refusing to
honor punitive civil penalties imposed on a federal facility for past violations of the
Clean Water Act), with United States v. Curtis, 988 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1993)
(upholding coercive penalties and criminal enforcement actions brought against federal employees). See generally Nelson D. Cary, Note, A Primer on Federal Facility
Compliance with EnvironmentalLaws: Where Do We Go From Here?, 50 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 801, 801 (1993) (exploring "the current ability of both state and federal regulators to enforce environmental laws against federal polluters").
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shot enforcement.' 15 Without consistent enforcement- both in
terms of obtaining complete relief from the courts and of a more
seamless enforcement system- defense agencies will continue to
look first to means for avoiding compliance rather than to compliance itself; that is, they will continue to focus on whether to
comply rather than how to comply.
Waiver of sovereign immunity vis et vis the states (pp. 18889) is, like abandoning the unitary executive doctrine, problematic- though it too may be the right thing to do. Such waivers
would naturally be (and currently are) subject to a requirement
of uniform treatment; that is, states must treat federal facilities
and activities no more strictly than non-federal ones. 1 6 Dycus
would require such uniformity (p. 188). The problem is that
while most components of federal facilities parallel those of private facilities (for example, housing, fleets of ordinary vehicles,
water treatment plants, and conventional factories), many do
not, and the latter group includes some of the worst environmental problems. Excess plutonium, reprocessing wastes, nerve
gas, and unexploded ordnance are, one hopes, unique to defense
activities.
Ensuring uniformity is extremely difficult in such cases. Dycus provides two examples of the problem, though he does not
acknowledge them as such. The state drinking water standards
for the chemical diisopropyl methylphosphonate (DIMP) at Rocky
Mountain Arsenal (p. 93) and the ban on the transportation of
nuclear materials in quantity through New York City were both
facially nondiscriminatory, but in fact they applied only or
mainly to a federal defense facility. DIMP is a chemical unique to
Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and the ban on transportation of spent
nuclear fuel through New York City really only affected DOE's
Brookhaven National Laboratories."'
DOD and DOE could be
115. One response to both the unitary executive and sovereign immunity obstacles is circumvention, and Dycus explores these possibilities in some depth. Citizen
suits, however, are limited by citizens' limited resources and access to funding for
litigation (pp. 168-69), and EPA or a state can take preemptive action that will supersede the citizen's action (p. 161). Similarly, actions against contractors who are following the express instructions of their contracts with the government will encounter
the government contractor defense (pp. 180-84). See generally Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (discussing a wrongful death action against an
independent contractor who supplied a military helicopter to the United States).
Thus, neither is a very good substitute for regular EPA and state enforcement.
116. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 6961(a), 7418(a), 9620(a)(4) (1994).
117. See, e.g., City of New York v. United States Dep't of Transp., 700 F. Supp.
1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd, 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983). The transportation ban
presumably would have affected the unpopular Shoreham nuclear power plant, too, if
that plant had ever become fully operational.
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justifiably concerned that such state rules reflect an effort to impose a state's own version of appropriate national policy on their
activities, a means of foisting unpopular defense activities onto
other states (it is probably not coincidental that the alternative
route for spent fuel from Brookhaven involved barging to neighboring Connecticut"), or simply a convenient way to be tough
on polluters without local repercussions. 1' 9 In any event, the
defense agencies are entitled to some assurance that military activities will not be governed by idiosyncratic state regulation. An
explicit and substantively well characterized exemption or waiver
process would do much to resolve these problems, and this, too,
would be a useful area for further study.
There are no simple solutions to the challenges of reconciling
real conflicts between defense and the environment, of moderating judicial deference to claims of military necessity, or of effective enforcement of existing laws. There are and will be cases of
genuine military need to engage in activities that harm the environment. The great value of National Defense and the Environment is in calling attention to these problems and giving lawyers
and legal scholars the incentive and the resources to begin addressing them.
REASONS FOR OPTIMISM

The reader may by now be wondering why the glass in this
Review's title is half-full and not half-empty. Although the current state of compliance and clean up is certainly suboptimal,
and the challenges of conforming defense activities to environmental protection are substantial, many opportunities exist for
defense activities to equal and exceed the performance of the private sector in protecting the environment. This message is implicit in many of the case studies and examples in National Defense and the Environment, and it has been evident time and
again in my own experience with the Department of Energy. In
fact, Dycus' most important message may be this: As the nation's largest polluters, the defense agencies have a duty not only
to avoid unnecessary environmental harm in their activities, but
also to take the lead in making decisions that fully consider and
reflect environmental consequences and fully involve the affected
118. See City of New York, 700 F. Supp. at 1298.
119. As DOD found at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, DOE found the federal agency
(the Department of Transportation) to be much more cooperative than state and local
authorities. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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public. Ultimately, the federal government has a unique opportunity to exercise moral leadership by taking responsibility for its
legacy of past environmental harm and for the continuing environmental impact of defense activities. This section examines
three areas in which the defense agencies are working to reconcile military preparedness and the environment: mission and
culture, environmental citizenship, and analytical tools. Developments in these areas promise to have value far beyond the
rather special setting of national defense.
A.

Mission and Culture

As James Q. Wilson has observed, an agency's mission and
culture determine its behavior. The mission is externally dictated (by legislation, for example), and the culture can be understood as the agency's internal (rank-and-file) perception of its
mission.120 Culture makes a bureaucracy effective in accomplishing the aspects of its mission that match its culture, but it
can frustrate the elements that do not. Wilson provides as an
example the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), whose mission includes both covert and analytical work. The CIA's dominant
culture, however, derived from the Office of Strategic Services
during the Second World War, rewarded only covert work. Consequently, essential analytical skills like counter intelligence deteriorated over time.'21

DOE has a parallel history. Its dominant culture, inherited
from the wartime Manhattan Project, emphasized production of
nuclear weapons with ever greater technical sophistication and
explosive yield. This culture facilitated the accomplishments of
the Groves-Oppenheimer era, but it also led to Cold War overkill.
Despite the fact that DOE was publicly committed as part of its
mission to the protection of public health and the environment, 2 and expressly required the same in its contracts with fa120. See JAMES Q. WILSON,
WHYTHEYDO IT 90-101 (1989).

BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND

121. See id. at 10 1-02. Wilson was writing long before the Aldrich Ames and Harold Nicholson betrayals became public in 1994 and 1996, respectively. Another parallel is the Tennessee Valley Authority, where the power culture eclipsed environmental protection goals, though Wilson attributes that instance to the influence of
outside interests. See id. at 72-74.
122. For example, the assurances of environmental protection that were given to
the public when the Fernald facility was built in 1951 are quite remarkable in their
modernity: baseline studies were promised, and deviations from the baseline were to
be closely monitored. See FertileFemaldAcres Soon to Produce Again- This ime for
Freedom, CIN. PosT, Sept. 26, 1951, at 24; Work on AEC Feeder Plant in High Gear;
Project Commitments Reach $31/2 Million, CIN. ENQUIRER, Aug. 17, 1951, at 1.
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cility operators,'23 the internal culture valued only production
long after the emergency of World War II was over. 124 A former
chief executive of the Atomic Energy Commission (DOE's predecessor) put it this way: "[D]ealing with waste... was not glamorous; there were no careers; it was messy; nobody got brownie
[T]here was no real
points for caring about nuclear waste ....
of the fuel cycle." 125
end
back
the
with
dealing
in
profit
or
interest
The secrecy that surrounded the whole enterprise eliminated the
possibility that external scrutiny could fill the gap in 26enforcement of the non-production elements of DOE's mission. 1
At the same time, government agencies have an enormous
capacity for change. Congress can dictate new policies (that is,
change the mission) and the President can change the leadership
(that is, partially change the culture) of agencies in ways that
cannot be imposed on the private sector. The pace of change is
often infuriatingly slow and frustratingly incomplete while career
bureaucrats wait out the political appointees, but no one can
doubt that environmental protection is now institutionalized
within DOD and DOE to an extent unimaginable even ten years
ago. In addition, while the armed services may be very much in
need of heightened environmental sensitivity, the command
structure makes such reform a real possibility. In DOE, the
cultural change away from production is more difficult, because
a rigid military command structure is absent.'2 7 Nevertheless,
former Energy Secretary O'Leary's commitment to openness at
DOE finally allowed outsiders to insist on compliance with non123. See, e.g., Crawford v. National Lead Co., 784 F. Supp. 439, 441 (S.D. Ohio
1989) (describing DOE's contract with the operator of the Fernald facility).
124. See CLOSING THE CIRCLE, supra note 4, at 8 (describing a 1948 report of the
Safety and Industrial Health Advisory Board to the Atomic Energy Commission,
which warned that the wartime rush to produce weapons had led to environmental
pollution).
125. Carroll Wilson, Nuclear Energy: What Went Wrong, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS,
June 1979, at 15 (Wilson was the first general manager of the Atomic Energy Commission, DOE's predecessor).
126. Former Secretary of Energy James D. Watkins spoke of "a 40-year culture
cloaked in secrecy and imbued with a dedication to the production of nuclear weapons without a real sensitivity for protecting the environment." COMPLEX CLEANUP, supra note 4, at 15.
127. While nuclear weapons production and maintenance are clearly military missions, the culture has always been aggressively civilian. Like many things about
DOE, this can be traced to the Manhattan Project. In order to create sophisticated
laboratories and massive industrial works, General Groves enlisted existing organizations- major universities and industrial firms- to build and operate the facilities.
The tensions between, for example, the Army and scientific cultures at Los Alamos
were legendary. See generally RHODES, supra note 34, at 453-55 (describing security
arrangements), 457 (describing Groves' displeasure with the physicists' fecundity).
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production goals. With the passage of time, managers committed to environmental protection are beginning to occupy senior
positions where they can effect the needed reforms.
It is a measure of Dycus' understanding of his subject that
he recognizes both the difficulties and opportunities posed by
agency culture. He emphasizes the new statements of mission
under which military commanders and soldiers operate (pp. 6-8,
74, 112-13, 186)28 because training and indoctrination are the
keys to incorporating cultural guidelines in organizational behavior. DOD has also institutionalized environmental concerns
in the literal sense. As noted above, DOD oversees its environmental performance at a very senior level.
Similarly, DOE has created an Office of Environmental Management, which now accounts for about one third of the agency's
budget, to handle its clean-up efforts (pp. 74-78, 112-13).129 Yet
it will be some time before the culture has fully changed. There
is still a core group of DOE employees who, it is said, never forgave President Reagan for winning the Cold War. Changing the
culture will require a firm, consistent, long-term public commitment to environmental protection. Halting, half-way, contradictory, or unfunded directions will not do the job. That is the
challenge and the opportunity that the defense establishment
poses for us.
B.
1.

Environmental Citizenship

Use of Economic Power

National Defense and the Environment describes many situations, whether or not explicitly recognized as such, in which the
fiscal and physical vastness of the American military establishment uniquely enables it to take constructive environmental action. At a minimum, government contracts can require compliance with environmental laws, and mean it. Indemnification for
the costs and penalties of environmental noncompliance by contractors must be scrapped. 130 DOD and DOE also have the eco128. For example, base commanders are now instructed that "stewardship of the
land, air, water and natural and cultural resources" is part of his or her mission (p.

6).
129. See CLOsING THE CIRCLE, supra note 4, at 1-9.
130. The cruel irony of the Fernald litigation was that the government's tort liability to the facility's neighbors was premised on the contractor's failure to abide by
contractual requirements to obey environmental laws.
Yet the indemnification
clauses of the agreement were interpreted to require DOE to pay the judgment (actu-
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nomic clout to use their procurement power to promote things
like pollution prevention and recycling (pp. 37-39, 76-77, 190).
DOD, for example, buys thousands of fairly ordinary vehicles,
putting it in a position to create a market for the commercial
production of low-emission vehicles in much the same way that
California has done by regulation. Additionally, where the startup costs of developing such vehicles, of recycling materials, or of
implementing pollution prevention strategies, are higher than a
private firm could absorb, the federal government is in a position
to invest the additional money to pursue the important national
policy of environmental protection.
The defense agencies have more experience, a greater need,
and larger resources than any private firm, so they are also
uniquely situated and motivated to make the long-range investments required to develop and improve technologies for environmental protection and restoration. DOD has made real progress
on developing interim clean-up strategies and generic remedies
(pp. 96-97), and DOE has a substantial environmental technology development program. To the extent that defense and civilian environmental problems overlap, these strategies and technologies can be transferred to the private sector.1 31 In other
words, the fact that DOD and DOE are the largest targets of environmental regulation need not mean that we should retreat
from environmental goals to help balance the budget. To the
contrary, it should mean that DOD and DOE take a leadership
role in developing effective and efficient ways to address environmental concerns.
2.

Stewardship
The vastness of DOE's and DOD's land holdings has (albeit

ally, settlement), regardless of the fact that the contract had been breached (pp. 77,
180 (citing Crawford v. National Lead Co., 784 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (order
approving settlement)).
131. For example, both defense and private facilities confront the serious and
widespread problem of removing dense, non-aqueous phase liquids from groundwater. There are no really effective remedies available at this time. See ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, PRESUMPTnVE RESPONSE STRATEGY AND Ex-Srru TREATMENT
TECHNOLOGIES FOR CONTAMINATED GROUNDWATER AT CERCLA SrTEs 13 (1996). So a
government-led effort to develop an effective treatment would have great utility in private clean-ups. DOE's technology development and technology transfer programs
seek to create public-private partnerships to address problems like this. See DOE
STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 13, at 25-29; see also DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, WASTE
ISOLAION PILOT PLANT, NATIONAL TRU PROGRAM, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (last modified
Aug. 19, 1998) <http:// www.wipp.carlsbad.nm.us/techtran/wipptt.htm> (describing
the technology transfer program at one DOE site).
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unintentionally) placed both agencies in the position of protecting large tracts of land from development (pp. 4-5, 111, 125). At
the Hanford site in Eastern Washington State, plutonium production and waste disposal activities have seriously contaminated only a fraction of the 560 square miles of reserved land.'
Some areas are extremely contaminated or are designated for
permanent storage of hazardous materials; they will certainly be
off-limits to the public for the indefinite future. But large tracts
of the huge buffer zone created when the site was established are
now a defacto wildlife preserve and can relatively easily be made
available for a wide variety of environmentally appropriate uses.
Indeed, the stretch of the Columbia River that runs through the
Hanford Reservation is the only stretch of the lower river that
has not been dammed for hydroelectric power, making it a natural resource of national significance. In 1992, DOE convened a
group of local, state, and federal government officials; Indian
Tribes; and a wide range of other stakeholders (labor, business,
environmental activists, agriculture, etc.) to consider the future
use of the Hanford site. Their report identified a large number of
potential uses for different parts of the site, ranging from habitat
preservation and recreation, to Native American cultural use, to
33

radioactive waste management. 1

Even at the much smaller (about one square mile) Fernald
facility in Ohio, the demolition of industrial buildings and the
removal of the most hazardous wastes will allow a future use of
the site that enhances its community by preserving vanishing
wetlands, by creating a new prairie over and around the low-level
radioactive waste disposal facility,"3
and by providing
greenspace or low-density development in a growing suburban
area. 35 Thus, at both Fernald and Hanford, government ownership and control makes possible a program of long-term environmental protection and improvement that would be difficult or
impossible to achieve on privately owned land.
132. See HANFORD FUTURE SITE USES WORKING GROUP, THE FUTURE FOR HANFORD:
USES AND CLEANUP (Dec. 1992). See generally Glenn Zorpette, Hanford's Nuclear
Wasteland, Sci. AM., May 1996, at 88-90 (describing the cleanup efforts at the
Hanford site).
133. See HANFORD FUTURE SITE USES WORKING GROUP, supra note 132.
134. An engineered disposal facility typically uses a covering of naturally occurring materials like clay and rock and vegetation, which have a much longer life than
synthetic materials like concrete and fabric covers and liners. A very shallow slope
and a shallow-rooting vegetative covering protect the soil cover from erosion very effectively; hence, a prairie-like setting is ideal.
135. See Femald Citizens Task Force, Recommendations on Remediation Levels,
Waste Disposition, Priorities, and Future Use 45-48 (1995).
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This pattern is repeated over and over again at both active
and inactive defense facilities. The Nature Conservancy and the
Air Force are collaborating to preserve the longleaf pine ecosystem in the relatively untouched forests of Elgin Air Force Base in
Florida. 3 6 The buffer zones around most of the major DOE facilities137 and (unlikely as it may seem) the Korean Demilitarized
Zone1 38 are remarkably pristine outdoor laboratories for studying
ecosystems that are threatened elsewhere. Even the Navy's facility on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico, which is the regular target
of practice amphibious assaults, is otherwise largely unused.
The facility attracts a substantial number of tourists who are
drawn to the island's "unspoiled" character. 139 In short, military
and weapons production activities are and were destructive of
their surroundings, but they can protect the environment in
other ways. The area in suburban Denver occupied by the Rocky
Mountain Arsenal, for example, would almost certainly have
been developed long ago were it not for military operations, and
would soon be developed were it not for its toxic legacy. Current
closure plans, however, call for the creation of the country's largest wildlife refuge. 14 0 The extensive land holdings of defense facilities present unique opportunities for preservation and research.
3.

Analytical Tools

The defense agencies can lead in the very different, but
equally important, area of developing analytical tools and policies
that will improve environmental compliance and management.
Given the scope of their environmental challenges, DOD and
DOE have a real incentive to adopt effective and efficient practices. 1 ' They also have the resources to develop them. DOE has
136. See id.
137. See Virginia H. Dale & Patricia D. Parr, Preserving DOE's Research Parks,
ISSUES INSci. & TECH., Winter 1997, at 73.
138. See Ke Chung Kim, Preserving Biodiversity in Korea's DemilitarizedZone, 278
SC. 242 (1997).
139. See Weekend Edition: The Island of Vieques, (NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 18,
1997) (Scott Simon reporting) (transcript pp. 7-10) (on file with author).
140. See Karen B. Wiley & Steven L. Rhodes, From Weapons to Wildlife: The Transformation of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, ENV'T, June 1998, at 4.
141. For example, it has recently been suggested that the anticipated future use of
a site be part of the selection of the type and degree of remediation. The idea is that
a site that will remain industrial need not be remediated to the level that would be
required for residential use. See Douglas J. Sarno, Future Use: Considerationsin the
Cleanup of FederalFacilities,HAZARDOUS MATERIALS CONTROL, May/June 1993, at 20,
25. EPA has accepted future use considerations to some degree. See ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENcY RESPONSE DIRECTIVE No.
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undertaken several pathbreaking studies of the nature and origins of the contamination of the Nuclear Weapons Complex facilities as the basis for developing a coherent and effective policy
for operating them and cleaning them up. The most recent of
these works, Linking Legacies, breaks weapons production down
into eight industrial processes, from mining uranium to testing
bombs in the Nevada desert, and analyzes their environmental
consequences. 14 2 The earlier Baseline Environmental Management Report (BEMR) undertook a fiscal (as opposed to physical)
linking of production activities with their environmental consequences. '4 It thus performed a life-cycle cost analysis of remedial activities to complement the front-end costs, which are usually the only ones considered in the budget process. In the
language of economics, BEMR, unlike the vast majority of public
cost accounting systems, includes the costs of environmental
externalities in the total cost of weapons production. A third
study, Risks and the Risk Debate, sought to characterize the environmental risks posed by the Nuclear Weapons Complex and to
link remedial expenditures with them. 144 Taken together, these
reports dramatically improve our overall understanding of the
connections between industrial activities, environmental consequences, and remedial and compliance costs.1

45

They also con-

firm the value of considering life-cycle costs in all industrial operations, including the full range of environmental externalities.
DOE has also taken a leadership role in applying risk analysis, the principal measure of environmental threat and of preventive or remedial accomplishment, towards managing its activities. It has been argued for quite some time, especially in the
business community, that environmental regulation should take
a more precise and more consistent account of risk in determining its targets and stringency. EPA has a strong risk analysis
program, and it undertook some early comparative studies to
determine the relative magnitude of the risks to human health
and the environment under its jurisdiction. In this way it hoped
9355.7-04 (memorandum from Elliot P. Laws, Assistant Administrator, dated May 25,
1995). The consideration of future use could make billions of dollars of difference to
DOE. See 1996 BEMR, VOLUME I, supranote 4, at 6-9 to 6-12.
142. See LINKING LEGACIES, supranote 4, at 117-206; see also CLOSING THE CIRCLE,
supra note 4.
143. See 1996 BEMR, VOLuME I, supranote 4, at 3-1 to 3-3.
144. See RISKS AND THE RISK DEBATE, supra note 21.
145. DOD was recently criticized by the General Accounting Office for its failure to
adequately develop these kinds of data and analyses in its environmental remediation
program. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: INFORMATION
USED FOR DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (1997).
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to identify the most pressing needs for regulatory action
and the
46
risk-reducing effectiveness of its existing programs.
Encouraged by Congress, 47 DOE's EM program also undertook a detailed analysis of the risks posed by the Weapons Complex in relation to its actual expenditures. The resulting study,
Risks and the Risk Debate,14' broke new ground in two ways.
First, the experience of developing and analyzing the available
risk information demonstrated, contrary to the assumption of
many risk analysis advocates, that a single quantitative metric
could not capture all of the risks within the EM program. Longterm risks of long-latency diseases to the public, short-term risks
of mechanical accidents to workers, and ecological harm to the
local natural and human environment could all be evaluated, but
they could not meaningfully be placed on a single linear scale.
This led to the. creation of a detailed qualitative matrix for each
type of harm and an emphasis on narrative characterization of
risks.'4 9 The development of a uniform, comprehensive, qualitative description of risks across the program allows comparisons
of severity and targets of risk to an extent not previously possible.
Second, Risks and the Risk Debate implicitly took on the
larger project of defining the roles of risk and other factors in
actual management decisions. The 1983 Red Book, which set
out the basic framework for risk analysis in use today, left risk
management largely unexplored, awaiting further experience
with the then-new assessment methodology.15 0 It thus permitted

146. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES
AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990); ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, COMPARING RISKS AND SETING ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES: OVERVIEW OF THREE
REGIONAL PROJECTS (1989); ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS:

A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987). Several states have
followed in EPA's footsteps. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECT, TOWARD
THE 21 ST CENTURY: PLANNING FOR THE PROTECTION OF CALIFORNIA'S ENVIRONMENT (1994).

147.

See H.R. REP. NO. 103-305, at 94-95 (1993).
RISKS AND THE RISK DEBATE, supra note 21.
See CERE, supra note 21, at app. A: RISKS AND THE RISK DEBATE, supranote
21, at app. C. The California comparative risk study had developed a similar methodology, CALIFORNIA COMPARATIVE RISK, supra note 146, at 4-10, building in turn on
the original EPA studies. For analyses of the difficulties of comparing quantitative
risk data, see John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in Itself. The Role of
Risk Assessment in Environmental Decision-Making,63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1643, 1658-64
(1995) [hereinafter A Beginning]. See also, e.g., COMPARING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS:
TOOLS FOR SETING GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES (J. Clarence Davies ed., 1996); WORST

148.
149.

THINGS FIRST?

THE DEBATE OVER RISK-BASED NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES

(Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding eds., 1994).
150. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK
GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983)

ASSESSMENT

[hereinafter RED BOOK].
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a wide variety of nonobjective considerations to be part of risk
management, but at the cost of transparent decisionmaking.
Risks and the Risk Debate, on the other hand, explicitly set out
the numerous factors that are considered in risk management,
and, to some extent, their relative importance.1 5 ' These include,
in addition to the various types of risk, the mission of the program,' 5 2 the future use of the facility, the costs of reducing the
risks, the adequacy of the available information, and the legal
framework.
DOE's Risk Principles memorialized this approach in a set of
guidelines for risk assessment and management.' 53 DOE's Risk
Principles have not received nearly the attention that they deserve- and they are in some danger of being forgotten within
DOE itself- but they ought to be a model for regulatory reform
legislation. Most of the currently fashionable political proposals
for risk-based decisionmaking and priority-setting are extremely
reductionist in their approach to risk, and they have a poorly
disguised political agenda of loosening environmental regulation."
The Risk Principles, on the other hand, recognize that
there are several risk endpoints (cancer, other human health ef151.

Public health and safety, worker health and safety, environmental protection,
See RISKS AND THE RISK DEBATE,
supranote 21.
152. The goals of the program are to "address truly urgent risks, assure worker
safety, assume managerial and financial control, become outcome oriented, focus
technology development, and become more customer/stakeholder oriented." Id. at
17, 39.
153. Under the traditional model of risk analysis, risk assessment is the process
of collecting and analyzing data regarding the sources and degree of risk, while risk
management is the process of using the risk data in operational decisions. See RED
BOOK, supra note 150, at 3. Current thinking rejects a rigid distinction between assessment and management. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK:

and compliance are considered "primary" factors.

INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

33-35 (Paul C. Stem & Harvey V. Fine-

berg eds., 1996) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING RISK]. The Risk Principles are contained
in DOE, RISK ASSESSMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND COMMUNICATION AND PRIORITY SETTING
(1995), reprintedin A Beginning, supra note 149, at 1675-77.
154. These points are developed in greater detail in A Beginning, supra note 149,
at 1648-51, 1672-74, and in Celia Campbell-Mohn & John S. Applegate, Learning
from NEPA: Guidelinesfor Responsible Risk Legislation, 23 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 93,
98-107 (1999). With a few exceptions, risk and regulatory reform legislation in the
104th and 105th Congresses would have mandated an information-intensive form of
risk analysis that is only really appropriate for environmental carcinogens. See H.R.
1404, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 981, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 9, 104th Cong. (1995);
H.R. 1022, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 333, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 343, 104th Cong.
(1995). This approach fails to recognize that many other health and environmental
concerns do not lend themselves to that analytical framework and that human health
risk is only one of many elements that need to go into risk management decisions.
Public values, blame, avoidance possibilities, cost, and a host of other factors must
be part of a risk management system.
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fects, ecological harm, etc.) and that they cannot be subsumed
into one stylized format for risk analysis. Moreover, the Risk
Principles anticipated the most recent National Academy of Sciences risk study, UnderstandingRisk, in regarding risk assessment as only one of a number of useful tools, each with distinct
limitations that must be fully understood by its users, for makMost recently, the Presidening management decisions. 155
tial/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Management developed a complex but comprehensive and thoughtful
Risk Management Framework, which allows for a broad range of
inputs, considerations, and analyses. 151 We now have, as a result of these efforts, an impressive arsenal of risk assessment
and management techniques that will make risk analysis a far
more accurate and responsive basis for environmental decisionmaking than it has been.
The size of DOD and DOE's environmental challenge, their
political and fiscal prominence, and the size and excellence of
their scientific and analytical resources are unique to federal (as
opposed to private) polluters. Within the federal government,
such resources are concentrated in the historically well-funded
defense agencies. These characteristics provide the defense
agencies with an opportunity to take a leadership role in environmental management across a wide spectrum of activitiesdeveloping pollution prevention and recycling strategies, supporting new remediation technologies, perfecting analytical techniques- and to share their strategies and expertise elsewhere in
government and with the private sector.
C.
1.

7ansparencyand Public Involvement

Benefits of Public Participation

The defense agencies can also lead in efforts to incorporate
public participation in their decisionmaking processes, despite
the difficulties created by such efforts. Environmental decisionmaking is both highly technical and highly contentious. The
155.

See UNDERSTANDING

RISK,

supra note

153, at 177; see also NATIONAL

RESEARCH COUNCIL, BUILDING CONSENSUS THROUGH RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION PROGRAM 20-21 (1994)
[hereinafter BUILDING CONSENSUS]; 2 PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON
RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT, RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN
2
[hereinafter
(1997)
7-15
REPORT
FINAL
DECISION-MAKING,
REGULATORY
PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMM'NI.
156. 2 PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMM'N, supra note 155, at 1-6 & passim.
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amount and complexity of the relevant information makes it difficult for the non-expert to understand and properly analyze all
of the material that is needed to reach a good decision. This often results in frustration by members of the public who want to
participate in environmental decisions and in a chronic and well
documented communication gap between experts and the lay
public.'5 7 At the same time, environmental protection implicates
deeply held values and strongly held views among members of
the public. The ethical and moral aspects of placing others at
risk, of harming a natural patrimony, and of limiting the quality
of life of future generations are by no means irrationalities that
can be brushed off as nonobjective or mere opinion. They are
the fundamental reasons for environmental protection in the first
place, and they must be part of any credible environmental decisionmaking processes.
The sorry tale of Yucca Mountain illustrates the perils of
planning without public participation (pp. 58-60, 115-16, 11921). The technical issues involved there are extremely complex.
They involve a geologically convoluted site, dangerous waste
material, advanced engineering, and the need to make projections of the interactions of geology, waste, and engineering over
the tens of thousands of years that the waste remains hazard5 8 Even if the science were not controversial (and it is very
ous."
controversial), disposal of high-level radioactive waste would be a
severely challenging problem. The waste puts some people at
risk now (for example, its neighbors in situ); transportation will
put others at risk during the emplacement period; and the continuing existence of the waste may put future generations at risk
while it remains hazardous. Moreover, the processes that generated the waste (nuclear power and weapons production) are
themselves controversial, so the resulting waste is not merely the
unpleasant consequence of a generally accepted activity. The result has been impasse, halfway measures, and further impasse.
Attempts to resolve the impasse by treating it as a technical
problem, by keeping the public at arm's length, or by fiat have so
far failed, 59 and Yucca Mountain's fate seems no closer to reso-

157. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 24, at 33-39; Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Cmn. L. REv. 1, 52-63 (1995).
158. See supra Part I.A. For an overview of the Yucca Mountain health risk issues, see COMMIrEE ON TECHNICAL BASES FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNICAL BASES FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS (1995).

159. Bills in the 105th congress sought to expedite the process by creating an
interim storage site at Yucca Mountain or by relaxing regulatory requirements. See

S. 104, H.R. 1270, 105th Cong. (1997). President Clinton had promised to veto the
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lution. A new approach is clearly needed to inform and communicate with the public on technical issues and to involve them
meaningfully in the decisions."
Public involvement leads to better decisions in a number of
ways.1 6' Simply at the level of information gathering, the neighbors of a facility can be helpful in identifying past occurrences
and present effects of which site personnel are unaware, especially where the neighbors have a longer institutional memory
than the present management. In risk assessment, for example,
neighbors can point out non-obvious exposure pathways, such
as those resulting from minority cultural activities and behavior
patterns. 62 For the agency, the process of explaining the basis
and reasons for a decision to a lay audience can help to highlight
assumptions, counterintuitive logic, and inconsistencies and
flaws in reasoning."
Outsider participation also cures the perennial bureaucratic problem of tunnel vision.
Public involvement can also improve relationships in an area
where the relationships are nonexistent or highly contentious, as
the National Academy of Sciences has emphasized.164 Access to
information and dialogue with decision makers can also result in
more realistic expectations by the public and by decision makers. It can lead to a mutual recognition that there are multiple
and sometimes conflicting goals at work, that there are many
relevant factors, and that there are real constraints (fiscal and
otherwise) on the means with which to accomplish the goals in
question. The nuclear waste disposal decision, for example, requires consideration of risk in the short term, to workers who
must handle the waste, and in the long term, to distant future
generations who may unwittingly come into contact with the
still-radioactive material. Open acknowledgment and exploration
bills, and an override seemed unlikely.
160. See EASTERLING & KUNREUTHER, supra note 42, at 167-92 (advocating starting
over so that a public consensus can be built around a new site); SCHRADERFRECHETrE, supra note 44, at 216-34 (advocating a negotiated MRS solution).
161. See John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizens Advisony Boards in Environmental Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L.J. 903, 947-51 (1998); see
also UNDERSTANDING RISK, supra note 153, at 23-24 (summarizing rationales for public participation).
162. See Robert R. Kuehn, The EnvironmentalJustice Implications of Quantitative
Risk Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 103, 124, 142 (1996).
163. Cf. William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85
YALE L.J. 38, 60 (1975) (describing the benefits of generalist judges' review of agency
reasoning). This was also a goal of NEPA. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm.,
Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (citing NEPA's
legislative history).
164. See BUILDING CONSENSUS, supra note 155.
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of these conflicts will result in greater confidence in the decisions
by all concerned.
Federal defense facilities are excellent places to explore new
modes of public participation. First, the public has a greater
While all pollution
stake in their environmental impacts.
sources and clean-up sites are a matter of legitimate public concern to their neighbors, federal facilities were built and are
maintained with public money and engage in activities that are
the subject of public policy. Their product, national defense, is
as public a public good as one can imagine.'6 5 Moreover, at defense facilities, the history of secrecy and indifference to environmental effects, including health effects to workers and neighbors, creates a distinct moral obligation to remedy the situation
in a public and participatory manner. As a result, DOE has
sought to develop a collaborative approach to risk analysis that
not only informs the interested public of the results of the analysis, but also involves the public in the development of analytical
tools, the collection of data, and the interpretation of results. 6 6
The use of an iterative process that repeatedly solicits information and views from the public, and makes adjustments accordingly, provides an opportunity to make risk analysis more responsive to public concerns and values, and to inform the public
of the nature and seriousness of the hazards at issue.1 67 In other
words, risk analysis is not only a proper object of public comment, but it can also be a tool for obtaining public involvement
and educating the public on complex environmental issues. 168
2.

Aspects of Public Participation

Effective public participation involves three components.
The first, emphasized throughout National Defense and the Environment, is openness or transparency. No credible or effective
program of public involvement can be based on incomplete information and secret decision making processes.1 69 Facts and
165. See Glen 0. Robinson, Conmmunities, 83 VA. L. REV. 269, 330 (1997).
2
supra note
155, at
12,
27-37;
166. See BUILDING
CONSENSUS,
PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMM'N, supra note 155, at 7, 15-33; UNDERSTANDING
RISK, supra note 153, at 91, 158-60.
167. See BUILDING CONSENSUS, supra note 166, at 3, 12-17, 35-37; 2
PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMM'N, supra note 155, at 32; UNDERSTANDING RISK,
supra note 153, at 94.
166,
at
13-14;
2
168. See
BUILDING
CONSENSUS,
supra note
PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMM'N, supranote 155, at 17.
169. Even in the rare cases in which environmental decisions require the use of
secret information, the gaps can be acknowledged and often worked around (pp. 16568). For example, on the question of deployment of nuclear weapons, on Navy vessels
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policies on the one hand, and decision making methods and processes on the other, must be visible to and understood by the
public. Thus, the centerpiece of Dycus' call for reform is that
defense activities follow existing environmental rules and procedures to the extent consistent with the real needs of national
defense. When an exemption from the regular rules and procedures is required, it should be explicitly identified and justified
(p. 149).
The second aspect of public participation is involvement, as
opposed to simply commenting on proposals.1 70 This encompasses, first, early participation, so that the public can help to
define what the issues are. For example, to frame the question
as a search for the most cost-effective technology, as Congress
did with chemical weapons decommissioning (p. 189), is to miss
many other considerations at issue. Second, communications
between the agency and the public must be in the nature of a
dialogue, that is, a process in which the involved persons speak
and listen to each other directly, respond candidly to each others' questions and concerns, and are willing to modify their views

and facilities, there are many reasons why the actual presence of nuclear weapons at
a specific place should be secret, but there is no apparent reason why the EIS at an
admittedly nuclear-capable location should not consider the impacts of the presence
of such weapons. The Supreme Court's acceptance of the latter practice in Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/PeaceEducation Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981), is the
kind of uncritical deference to claims of military necessity that Dycus rightly decries
(pp. 24-26). Even the environmental management of the nuclear weapons program,
which has, as one would expect, many secrets, is not seriously affected by secrecy.
At the Nevada Test Site, the precise radionuclide content of the cavities created by
underground testing is classified because it would reveal, through a process of reverse engineering, all of the materials that comprised the weapon being tested, many
of which are strictly classified. See 1 NEVADA RISK ASSESSMENT/MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM, PRELIMINARY RISK ASSESSMENT OF DOE SrrEs IN NEVADA 4, 38-39, 53 (1996)
[hereinafter NRAMP]; LINKING LEGACIES, supra note 4, at 117-23. For environmental
remediation purposes, however, the key issues are not their identities but whether,
given the hydrogeology of the Test Site, they will migrate to groundwater, where the
groundwater goes, how long that process will take, and whether the contaminated
groundwater will be accessible to the public, with or without institutional controls.
While knowledge of the precise identities of the radionuclides would refine the analysis, in my view it is sufficient for most purposes simply to assume that the fission byproducts are highly radioactive and long-lived. See NRAMP supra, at 1:38-39, 56-57,
67-68, 76; 2:155-77. The risk assessors, using a few unclassified fission products as
representative, found that there was very little risk from fission by-products to off-site
persons, but a high risk to a future person who drilled directly into one of the cavities
in search of groundwater. This conclusion obviously depends far less on the exact
nature of the contaminants (that is, differences in toxicity) than on hydrogeology and
human behavior (that is, differences in exposure).
170. The difference between involvement and comment is developed in Applegate,
Beyond the Usual Suspects, supra note 161, at 907-26. See also DANIEL FIORINO,
MAKING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 96 (1995).
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to account for new information and perspectives. This process
demands much of the participants, and it is fair to expect that
the government would take the first steps to initiate and facilitate a genuine dialogue.'1'
Third, environmental decisions remain highly technical issues, and the government must take some responsibility for
helping members of the public to understand the concepts and
facts that are needed to participate. The government must provide information, but it "must also create or support institutions
for participation and decisionmaking that will help citizens make
use of their new information."' 7 2 This includes candid disclosure
and discussion of weaknesses, uncertainties, and assumptions- in short, enabling the public to ask the hard questions.
The National Research Council describes this procedure (in the
risk context) as "analytic-deliberative":
Its success depends critically on systematic analysis that is
appropriate to the problem, responds to the needs of the interested and affected parties, and treats uncertainties of importance to the decision problem in a comprehensible way.
Success also depends on deliberations that formulate the decision problem, guide analysis to improve the decision participants' understanding, seek the meaning of analytic' findings and uncertainties, and improve the ability of interested
and affected parties
to participate effectively in the risk deci73
sion process. 1

Defense agencies must be committed to such deliberation with
the public and must make that deliberation possible.
3.

Techniquesfor Achieving Meaningful PublicParticipation

Meaningful public participation can be accomplished in a
number of ways. Dycus notes the creation by DOD of restoration
advisory boards, comprised of neighbors of bases slated for closure, to make suggestions on the clean-up and the future use of
the site (p. 102). He also commends the innovative idea of a
base-closure environmental ombudsman who would be an informed conduit for exchanging information and views (p. 134).
171. Cf.ROBERT B. REICH, THE POWER OF PUBUC IDEAS 124, 137-47 (1988) (describing a governmental role as educator and facilitator for public deliberation); Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation:An Interpretive Essay, 94
YALE L.J. 1617, 1637-38 (1985) (describing a public administrator's Job as helping
the public deliberate over the decisions that need to be made).
172. SUSAN G. HADDEN, A CmZEN'S RIGHT TO KNOW: RISK COMMUNICATION AND
PuBuc POLICY 16 (1989).
173. UNDERSTANDING RISK, supranote 153, at 158.
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Another, more elaborate technique in use at DOE sites is the
site-specific advisory board (SSAB). The brainchild of a 1991 Office of Technology Assessment report 7 4 and of the 1993 and
1996 reports of EPA's Federal Facilities Environmental Restoration Dialogue Committee, SSABs are intended to address the
lack of public confidence in the federal cleanup program. They
are also intended to repair several specific problems with previous forms of public participation, such as the lack of early involvement, the absence of real two-way dialogue, and the overwhelming number of technical issues to which the public was
expected to respond. 7 5
Site-specific advisory boards (SSABs), as the term is used in
this report, are independent public bodies established to provide policy and technical advice to the regulated and regulating agencies with respect to key clean-up decisions. 176
The Committee recommends that SSABs should reflect the
full diversity of views in the affected community and region
and be composed primarily of people who are directly affected
by site clean-up activities. Thus, in addition to regulated and
regulating agencies serving as ex-officio members, the Committee recommends the following affected stakeholders be
given primary consideration for SSAB membership: individual
residents that live in the communities or regions in which a
site is located; representatives of citizen, environmental, and
public interest groups whose members live in the communities or regions in which a site is located; workers or representatives of workers involved in or affected by clean-up operations at the site, with a priority for clean-up and
production workers who are currently employed at the site;
and representatives of Indian Nations and other indigenous
people that have treaty or statutory rights that are affected by
clean-up activities at the site. 177

174. COMPLEX CLEANUP, supranote 4, at 139-41.
175. See Federal Facilities Environmental Restoration Dialogue Committee, Consensus Principles and Recommendations for Improving Federal Facilities Cleanup,
Final Report 48 (1996) [hereinafter FFERDC Final Report]; see also Federal Facilities
Environmental Restoration Dialogue Committee, Recommendations for Improving the
Federal Facilities Environmental Restoration Decision-Making and Priority-Setting
Process, Interim Report 20 (1993) ("The net result is that many stakeholders consider
the current methods for soliciting input to be too late in the process, inefficient due to
overlap with other efforts, and ineffective because the result is often a one-way communication instead of a two-way dialogue.") [hereinafter FFERDC Interim Report].
176. FFERDC, Interim Report, supranote 175, at 20.
177. Id. at 24-25; see also FFERDC, Final Report, supranote 175, at 50, 54-57.
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DOE has established SSABs at all of its major sites. 178
SSABs have demonstrated their capacity to engage citizens,
build trust, and make better decisions at a number of DOE sites.
The SSAB at DOE's Fernald site, the Fernald Citizens Task
Force, 179 produced, after nearly two years of intensive study and
deliberation, consensus recommendations that amounted to a
blueprint for the remediation and closure of the Femald site. 180
Other SSABs have been effective in different ways. The Hanford
Advisory Board, which is coping with a far larger and more multifaceted site, has largely forgone holistic approaches in favor of
many specific consensus recommendations on a wide variety of
topics. It, too, has helped to move that site toward resolution of
key issues and toward speedier and cheaper clean-up. The
boards at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Rocky
Flats, and the Nevada Test Site have taken a similar tack. The
SSAB process has thus proven itself to be a flexible framework
for learning and dialogue. One senior DOE official told the
178. DOE's public involvement website lists eleven SSABs (last modified May 5,
1996) <http://www.em.doe.gov/stake/sitdir.html>. In 1994, DOE published detailed
guidance for SSAB functions and operation. See DEP'T OF ENERGY, SSAB GUIDANCE,
FINAL (1995).
179. The site and its contamination problems are described in Dycus, pp. 77. 8081, 183-84.
See also FERNALD AREA OFFICE, DEP'T OF ENERGY, 1996 SrrE
ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT (1996); FERNALD CrTZENS TASK FORCE, supra note 135. Descriptions of the Task Force process may be found in FERNALD CITIZENS TASK FORCE,
supra note 135; Jennifer J. Duffield & Stephen P. Depoe, Lessons from Fernald: Reversing NIMBYism Through Democratic Decisionmaking, RISK POLICY REPORT [INSIDE
EPA], Feb. 21, 1997, at 31-34; John S. Applegate & Douglas J. Sarno, Coping with
Complex Facts and Multiple Parties in Public Disputes, CONSENSUS, July 1996, at 1.
The Federal Facilities Environmental Restoration Dialogue Committee characterized
the Fernald process as "one of the more successful" in its final report. FFERDC Final
Report, supra note 175. at 51.
180. See FERNALD CITIZENS TASK FORCE, supra note 135. In its recommendations,
the Task Force adopted a principled middle ground that ensured protection of human
health but recognized technological and fiscal constraints: Only the most intensive
future uses of the site (residential and agricultural) are prohibited; residual risk levels
protect the aquifer from further contamination but minimize surface disruption and
waste generation; the aquifer is to be restored to EPA's proposed drinking water
standard; the most hazardous waste is to be transported off-site, while highvolume/low-risk material is to remain on-site in an engineered disposal facility; and
the site will follow an accelerated clean-up. All of the recommendations were unanimous except waste disposition, as to which one member dissented from an on-site
disposal facility. Another member, while not dissenting from the recommendations,
believed that the residual risk estimates were unduly conservative. The recommendations were formally accepted by DOE and its regulators after general public comment. Congress expressly recognized Femald's clear path forward and earmarked
extra funds for its implementation. See H.R. REP. No. 104-293, at 66 (1995). Congress similarly ratified the land use plan adopted by the Joliet Arsenal Citizen Planning Commission. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-106, §§ 2911-2932, 110 Stat. 186, 595-608.
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Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and
Risk Management:
The department has learned the power of having the public
involved in decision-making. For example, the citizens advisory board at Femald has dramatically changed the department's clean-up strategy at that Ohio site. The results will be
a far more expeditious clean-up, with a savings of some $2
billion compared with the cost of the department's original
plan. By opening the process to meaningful public input, the
to make decisions that it could
department is empowered
18 1
never make unilaterally.

While SSABs were designed for the clean-up of defense facilities, they, like the technologies and analytical techniques already mentioned, can be exported to other localized decisions,
such as comprehensive air permits," 2 hazardous waste siting
decisions,'" a and brownfields development.'"
DOE considered but did not fully implement a much more
ambitious project, called the National Dialogue, to engage the
public on a nationwide basis on the extremely sensitive subject
of the disposal of military nuclear waste.18 5 The overall strategy
for the National Dialogue, developed in collaboration with the
League of Women Voters, was to educate the public about this
complex issue (there are hundreds of waste streams at over fifty
different sites and any number of possible permutations of
treatment, storage, and disposal technologies and locations) and
then to provide a forum in which citizens at generator sites could
work with citizens at recipient sites and vice versa. It was to in181. 1 PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMM'N, supra note 155, at 39 (quoting Dr.
Carol Henry); see also CEQ & OMB, FEDERAL FACILrrIES PoiLCY GROUP, IMPROVING
FEDERAL FAcILrTIES CLEANUP 28 (1995) available at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/iffc-2.html>; Radioactive Waste: Cleanups
Consistentwith Profitabilityof Companies, Energy UndersecretarySays, 27 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) 239 (May 10, 1996) (quoting Undersecretary of Energy Thomas P. Grumbly).
182. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(k), 7661 (1994).
183. See, e.g., MICHAEL GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK (1996); Peter
Margulies, Building Communities of Virtue: Political Theory, Land Use Policy, and the
"'Not in My Backyard' Syndrome", 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 945, 964 (1992).
184. See, e.g., E. Lynn Grayson & Stephen A.K. Palmer, The Brownfields Phenomenon: An Analysis of Environmental, Economic, and Community Concerns, 25
ENVrL. L. REP. 10337 (1995); R. Michael Sweeney, Brownfields Restoration and Voluntary Cleanup Legislation, 2 ENvTL. LAw. 101 (1995); Douglas A. McWilliams, Environmental Justice and IndustrialRedevelopment: Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization,21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 705 (1994).

185. See John S. Applegate & Sharon Lloyd-O'Connor, Decision Time for DOE:
LWVEF Urges National Dialogue on Nuclear FacilitiesCleanup, THE NAT'L VOTER, Jan.
1998, at 14. Current information on the status of the National Dialogue can be found
on the League of Women Voters website. National Dialogue on Nuclear Material and
Waste (last modified June 26, 1997) <http://www.1wv.org/nuke/about.html>.
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volve the consideration- in addition to the standard issues of
risk, cost, alternatives, etc.- of the long-term effectiveness of
disposal technologies; equitable distribution of risk among
states, communities, and generations; and the hazards of waste
transportation among sites and states. A number of small-scale
efforts (relating to a single form of waste, for example) have provided valuable communication and insight, but no mechanism
for integrating these results into program-wide decisions is yet in
place.
86
DOE's present plans for public participation are unclear,
but it has an opportunity to take the lead in educating the public
about the issues it faces and engaging it in a sustained, productive discussion. Such a process, if it can be made to work in the
DOE context, could be extremely useful in addressing other national environmental problems that have so far resisted solution,
such as interstate waste transportation, civilian radioactive
waste, and interstate air and water pollution.
CONCLUSION

Public involvement is a two-way street. It demands a substantial initial commitment from the government, but it cannot
be sustained without a matching commitment from the public
participants to openness, to dialogue, and to tackling the hard
questions. Dycus, appropriately, closes his book with a series of
"Challenges to Individual Citizens" (pp. 193-94). Here again his
good sense and sound judgment serve the reader well. Most of
the challenges he poses throughout the body of National Defense
and the Environment are directed toward the defense establishment: to obey existing laws, to be candid about real defense and
secrecy needs, and to seek exemptions openly and only when
they are really necessary. There are also the implicit challenges
that this Review has highlighted: to develop standards for adjusting genuine conflicts between defense activities and the environment; to recognize the legitimate needs of national security
but avoid uncritical deference to such claims; to find ways to
make external enforcement of environmental rules and procedures fair and effective; and to seize opportunities to take a leadership role in developing environmentally sensitive policies and
practices. In the final analysis, however, we all must face up to
these challenges. The issues are complex, they involve compet186. DOE is committed to public participation on these issues, but the form it will
take has not been fully determined. See PATHS TO CLOSURE, supra note 14, at 6-3 to
6-11.
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ing goods, and they are often highly technical. Moreover, their
resolution will not be cheap. It will certainly "be difficult for us
to sustain the political will to make the necessary expenditures"
because "future federal budgets will be tight" (p. 192).11' Without
responsive and informed citizens monitoring defense activities,
insisting on compliance with environmental laws, and accepting
the opportunities to participate in environmental decisions, the
challenges cannot be met. Professor Dycus has. provided a firm
foundation for active engagement in these difficult legal and environmental policy issues. We should heed his call to action.

187. The current budget surplus does not undermine this prediction because
neither the President nor Congressional leaders have considered applying the surplus
towards environmental programs. President Clinton has committed the extra money
to Social Security and other worthy programs. For their part, the Republicans would
erase the surplus with tax cuts. Therefore, counter-intuitive as it seems, the budget
for environmental programs remains tight.
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